

~~SECRET~~

~~CIA Internal Use Only~~  
~~Access Controlled by CIA Historical Staff~~


This document has been  
approved for release through  
the HISTORICAL REVIEW ALGORITHM of  
the Central Intelligence Agency.

Date 26 APR 94

HRP 91-2

ALLEN WELSH DULLES  
AS DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
26 FEBRUARY 1953 - 29 NOVEMBER 1961  
VOLUME II COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE

DCI-2



by

Wayne G. Jackson

HISTORICAL STAFF  
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Contents

	<u>Page</u>
I. Coordination of National Intelligence	
Production . . . . .	1
National Vs. Departmental Intelligence . . . . .	4
National Estimates . . . . .	12
Current Intelligence . . . . .	18
Other Coordinated National Intelligence Publications . . . . .	24
Photographic Intelligence . . . . .	26
Scientific Intelligence . . . . .	34
ELINT . . . . .	77
II. Coordination of Clandestine Collection . . . . .	98
Coordination of Activities . . . . .	98
Agreed Activities . . . . .	114
NSCID 5 . . . . .	116
DCID 5/1 . . . . .	124
The Trudeau Affair . . . . .	126
After the Trudeau Affair . . . . .	134
III. Evolution of USIB . . . . .	150
USCIB . . . . .	156
Merger of IAC and USCIB . . . . .	159
Appendix A. Source References . . . . .	172

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Allen Welsh Dulles

As Director of Central Intelligence

26 February 1953 - 29 November 1961

Volume II Coordination of Intelligence

Chapter 1

Coordination of National Intelligence Production

One word which occurs again and again in relation to CIA is "coordination." This is scarcely strange since coordination was perhaps the most important task laid on the DCI when CIA was created. The word, by the way, is usually used without explicit definition, perhaps because the practical application of the concept is subject to such a wide variety of interpretations. To President Eisenhower, to coordinate seemed to mean to insist that duplication of functions in the intelligence community be ended and that the various components be welded into a harmonious

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

whole capable of producing a commonly agreed intelligence base for policymaking. This harmony was to be achieved by the DCI's instructing the other departments and agencies as to the role they should play. A secondary aim was to reduce the cost of the national intelligence effort. The President's Board of Intelligence Consultants had much the same view. Dulles's concept of coordination, which grew out of his temperament and his clearer appreciation of how to handle entrenched power, was to convince the various intelligence services through negotiation and persuasion that it was to the national advantage as well as their own advantage, to work together cooperatively.

The National Security Act of 1947 in Sec. 102

(d) specifies the functions of CIA under an introduction which starts

For the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies....

Sec. 102 (d) (2) charges the Agency

to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of such intelligence activities of the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

departments and agencies of the Government as relate to the national security.

The responsibility given under Sec. 102 (d) (3), "to correlate and evaluate intelligence relating to the national security" and to disseminate it, does not use the words "coordination" or "produce" but NSCID 1, starting with the version of 21 April 1958, contained a footnote defining the word "produce", as used there, to mean "to correlate and evaluate...", a definition which merely spelled out what had long been the agreed definition in the intelligence community. The correlated and evaluated intelligence produced under this section is normally referred to as "coordinated intelligence," meaning that the relevant members of the intelligence community have been consulted, their views taken into account, and a consensus obtained to the extent possible.

Thus the Act in substance envisages two kinds of coordination: (1) the production of "coordinated intelligence," which is a specific substantive finding drawn from the resources of the departments and agencies, and (2) the regulation of the intelligence activities of member departments and agencies

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of the Government so that they are "coordinated." In this case, coordination means the avoidance of duplication of effort, the meshing of the activities of the various members of the community with each other so that the most effective use of assets is achieved. In the vast number of papers regarding intelligence, the distinction between these two-types of "coordination" is often not observed, and analogies from the production of "coordinated intelligence" are used freely in discussing the "coordination of activities." Yet they are quite different concepts; procedures relating to one are not applicable to the other; and the forces at work in each case are quite different.

#### National Vs. Departmental Intelligence

Allen Dulles was well aware that one of his main tasks was to promote the production of coordinated intelligence, i.e., the production of agreed intelligence for the use of non-intelligence consumers. Such production was, of course, one of the main reasons why CIA was created. It was for this that CIA was charged by the National Security Act of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1947 to correlate, evaluate, and disseminate intelligence relating to the national security. One of the difficulties in achieving the production of coordinated intelligence is reflected in the wording of the National Security Act. The provision that reserved to other members of the community the power "to collect, evaluate, correlate and disseminate departmental intelligence" not only reflects the legitimate requirement of these members for intelligence for strictly departmental needs but also is a monument to the fear of these members that CIA would try to supersede their established intelligence functions.

The distinction between "departmental" intelligence and "intelligence relating to the national security" is often in the eye of the beholder; it cannot be defined *in vacuo*, and standards for distinguishing one from another, which appear in NSCID 1, are subject to various interpretations. Military matters such as the deployment of forces or the procurement of weapons systems have political consequences; conclusions about the state of internal security in

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

foreign countries or their political objectives in many cases have military implications in these days of world-wide systems of bases and communications facilities, to say nothing of alliances. Then, of course, economic policies and actions have political and military consequences. It would be easy enough to argue that there is very little important intelligence which affects one department alone.

The recognition of the wide variety of factors involved in any major intelligence problem led various departments to attempt to cover many fields which, while not in themselves strictly matters of departmental concern, were relevant to their major departmental responsibilities. It was in part this ballooning of the intelligence components of the various departments which led to the creation of a central agency to coordinate and to perform tasks of common concern.

The enactment of the National Security Act and the establishment of a central agency to produce coordinated intelligence did not of themselves ensure that a commonly agreed intelligence product would result. Coordination in this sense was not a secretarial job; it required leadership which in

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

turn required competence. Such competence was not acquired overnight; confidence and acquiescence had to be earned. Thus the acceptance of CIA as coordinator required both competent personnel and experience. Both were acquired slowly by CIA, and constant pressure was needed to overcome the centrifugal forces which were at work. Some of this pressure came from the President's Board of Consultants, which was set up in January 1956. 1/\* This Board was constantly urging Dulles to exercise his coordinating responsibilities; in most cases what it meant was the exercise of what it believed to be the DCI's powers to reduce duplication of effort in the community.

The opposition to centralizing the production of intelligence which had a significance beyond the needs of a single department was not based on bureaucratic inertia and possessiveness alone; other legitimate or understandable forces were at work. Any organization tends to prefer that the intelligence it needs is produced by its own staff which is manned by people who will understand its special problems and which will give first priority to the matters the organization believes

---

\* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix A.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

important and will present its findings in the way most responsive to the particular organization's needs.

Another factor which bears on this matter is that when senior departmental officials have direct control over the people who produce intelligence for them, the latter can be influenced to emphasize the intelligence or to reach conclusions which will be consistent with the policy predilections of their superiors. This factor was manifested when representatives of departmental intelligence components at coordinating meetings frankly said, in informal conversations, that they were under binding instructions from their superiors to hold out for specific intelligence conclusions, no matter how the representatives themselves interpreted the evidence. It is obviously not possible to document this factor, but anyone experienced in interdepartmental coordination of intelligence has met it and recognizes its importance.

When a nonprofessional intelligence officer is assigned to intelligence, he knows that in time he will find himself assigned elsewhere in an entirely different role. The acceptability to his superiors of his performance while serving in intelligence may well influence his future career. The concept

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

of complete objectivity in the reaching of intelligence conclusions is, of course, never attacked openly, but it is a concept which is difficult to realize and the product of complete objectivity can sometimes be quite embarrassing to the holder of a particular policy position. It was to try to provide an intelligence mechanism with a built-in bias towards objectivity that CIA was created and the attempt was made to insulate it from policy formulation.

Dulles was perfectly aware of the complexity of the forces at work. He had been aware of these forces before the CIA was created; his advocacy of the creation of a centralized intelligence system in the memorandum which he submitted to the Congress in 1947 when the National Security Act was being discussed shows this. 2/ Much had already been done when he became DCI, and the picture which emerges from his administration is one of an increasing degree of interdepartmental action aimed at the production of a coordinated intelligence. But in many cases, progress was slow. It would be difficult to say how much his method of proceeding

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

arose out of his understanding of the difficulties involved, or out of his belief that the seeking of willing cooperation was more effective than an attempt to exercise authority, or out of his personal predilection for avoiding clashes and controversy. An attempt to weigh the relative importance of these factors would be unrewarding; they all tended in the same direction and would all result in the same general method of operation.

He was by no means averse to seeking high-level backing for his attempts to promote coordination. In August 1957, President Eisenhower sent the members of the NSC a memorandum in which he referred to certain recommendations made by the President's Board. The memorandum read in part:

The exercise of a more comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility by the Director of Central Intelligence can be of the utmost value to the entire intelligence community and strengthen the national intelligence effort...All members of the intelligence community will render the Director of Central Intelligence the fullest possible cooperation in the accomplishment of this objective. 3/

In this case, all kinds of coordination were meant, and the principal objective was to ensure as sound

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

an intelligence base for the policymakers as possible. The memorandum had been drafted by Dulles and was in connection with his proposal to appoint General Lucien K. Truscott as Deputy Director for Coordination. 4/ Independent outside forces other than the President's Board were also creating pressure for more authority for the DCI. The Clärk Task Force of the Hoover Commission in 1954 had urged greater coordination, as did the Joint Study Group in 1960.

Aside from these pressures for interdepartmental coordination, other factors tending in the same direction were at work. A growing appreciation of the wide ramifications of important intelligence problems brought greater acceptance within the Government of the need for authoritative community judgments. The evaluation of the Soviet threat was seen to involve political and economic as well as military aspects, just as Soviet political policy was affected by Soviet military and economic capabilities. CIA became more acceptable as a coordinator as the component parts of the Agency grew in stature and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

experience (and *continuity* of experience was an important part of this growth).

#### National Estimates

The most important form of "coordinated intelligence," frequently cited and with approval, was the National Intelligence Estimate (NIE).<sup>\*</sup> Dulles set great store by these estimates and retained a lively interest in their development. He was a firm believer in one important feature of the estimate, as established under General Smith. It is that the document is the Director's estimate and he has the final say as to what it will include and the judgments expressed. The USIB (before September 1958, the IAC) was advisory to him and its members could express differing views when the estimate was discussed in plenary meeting, but they had to concur or dissent and state their differing judgments,

---

\* The NIE was well established as a coordinated estimate during the administration of General Smith as DCI. For a full discussion of the evolution of national estimates, see L. L. Montague, *General Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence, October 1950-February 1953* (DCI Historical Series, DCI-1).

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

usually by specifying alternative language.

Underlying virtually all estimates presented to the USIB through 1961 was the procedure whereby contributions were prepared by the participating agencies and a detailed discussion of the draft or successive drafts were conducted under the supervision of the Board of National Estimates -- a group of senior officers of sufficient stature and prestige to be able to make final decisions as to what the draft submitted to the DCI and through him to the USIB should contain. The final text, of course, had to state views which the DCI would adopt as his own. Under this procedure for preparing an estimate, each member of the intelligence community having a legitimate interest in the subject matter at hand brought to bear all the intelligence it wished to submit, had a day in court to seek concurrence in its point of view, and had an opportunity to express its dissent. As informed representatives of the components of the intelligence community met in the discussions before the Board of National Estimates, they felt at perfect liberty to argue without paying too much attention to interdepartmental courtesy, and there was usually no overriding pressure

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of time to cut discussion short. The draft estimates which emerged from the Board of National Estimates may or may not have contained dissents and were, of course, open to discussion at the USIB level.

It was Dulles's practice to meet with representatives of the Board of National Estimates before the USIB meeting and make changes in the draft when he believed they were needed. Discussion of the draft at the USIB level was sometimes wholly perfunctory when there were no divergent views. At other times, there were long discussions; on these occasions Dulles was careful to give each member a full opportunity to state his position and to argue for it. In all but very rare instances the final printed document had as its text the DCI's estimate with divergent views stated as footnotes. The rare occasions in which this form was not followed involved estimates which dealt with very important matters in which Dulles's estimate stood alone, or virtually alone, against the estimates of other USIB members. In a few such cases, the various positions of all USIB members were stated

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

in the main text. An example is the 1960 estimate.. which covered Soviet ICBM capabilities in the heat of the "missile gap" controversy -- NIE 11-8-60.\*

It should be noted that not all the draft NIE's which came before the USIB during Dulles's administration followed the preparatory procedures described above. In the drafting of estimates on the Soviet nuclear energy program, the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee (JAEIC) played the principal substantive role.\*\*

There was a significant difference between the coordination process which resulted in estimates or contributions prepared by JAEIC and that applied to the estimates which went through the normal process in the Office of National Estimates (ONE). This difference shows the variations which could occur in the process referred to by the general term "coordination." In the case of the former, drafts of papers were usually prepared by the JAEIC

---

\* See Volume V, Chapter 2.

\*\* JAEIC also prepared contributions to other estimates which embraced nuclear energy matters.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

staff. Such drafts were circulated to the members.. and, at subsequent meetings, the comments and suggestions of the constituent members were obtained. These comments and suggestions were noted by the secretariat and in many cases changes were made in the draft. There was no procedure by which the whole draft was gone over line by line and either agreement or dissent recorded on the specific wording of the draft.\* The Chairman of JAEIC was not endowed with the power to decide on a specific issue and to invite dissents. It is true that the drafters attempted to record the sense of the meeting and that it was seldom that disclaimers were subsequently made by members. However, such disclaimers were sometimes made, particularly when a JAEIC contribution was being discussed during the coordination of an NIE. It was by no means exceptional for one of the representatives at the ONE coordinating meeting (usually Dr. Charles Reichardt of the AEC) to say, "I don't agree with the JAEIC

---

\* This was the procedure for NIE's prepared in ONE.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

contribution, which I never saw anyway," even though the AEC representative may have attended JAEIC meetings.

It was unfortunate when the questioning of the contribution of a technical committee raised technical or scientific problems in a forum not fully equipped to deal with them. Such a situation sometimes arose from the unwillingness of a particular agency to accept the consensus nominally achieved in JAEIC and to that extent reflected, in part, inadequate procedures in JAEIC. It sometimes arose from the fact that at the NIE coordination meetings a different representative appeared who did not agree with his colleague on JAEIC. If, however, the JAEIC contribution contained, explicitly or implicitly, non-technical judgments, e.g., Soviet intentions, policy, or strategic concepts, the questioning of a JAEIC contribution by someone having a less technical viewpoint was perfectly legitimate and, indeed, useful. When estimates contained or were based on technical or scientific contributions, situations in which there was a re-argument in one

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

forum of a matter already argued in another were ..  
probably unavoidable.

#### Current Intelligence

Another form of coordinated intelligence established under Dulles was the daily *Central Intelligence Bulletin*, issued by CIA after consultation with other USIB members.\* What had been initially a CIA publication on matters of current intelligence -- although it had been subject to a certain amount of informal interdepartmental discussion -- became in January 1958 a publication which was designed to supersede, for important policymakers, the plethora of disparate current intelligence reports produced by separate organizations such as the National Indications Center and the components of the Armed Services. The initiative for this change came from the President's Board of Consultants.\*\*

---

\* See G. Fred Albrecht, *History of Central Intelligence Bulletins*, DDI Historical Series, OCI-1, May 1967. (TS)

\*\* The Inspector General also recommended this sort of publication. 5/

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Under date of 18 March 1957, the President's Board sent a memorandum to Dulles raising the matter of a coordinated current intelligence publication. The board's idea was not only to reduce duplication and thereby costs, but to try to encourage the establishment of a single authoritative document for circulation to policymakers. This was discussed in the IAC more than once. The general view of Dulles and the other members was similar to that expressed by the State member, Park Armstrong, who said that "current intelligence could not be 'coordinated' and remain 'current'." 6/ Arrangements were set up for informal quick consultation in the production by CIA of the *Central Intelligence Bulletin*.

This did not satisfy the President's Board for long, and early in 1960 there was circulated to USIB members a memorandum from the Staff Director of the President's Board (J. Patrick Coyne) which said that the board was reviewing the intelligence issuances of the community and asking USIB to prepare a list of all the periodic publications on any substantive aspect of intelligence issued by a

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

headquarters or field component of any member. . The resources devoted to this task, including an estimate of costs, were also to be listed. 7/ To do the job, USIB set up an ad hoc committee, which rendered three reports. 8/ The first was a 55-page listing of some 130 publications with an estimated cost of more than \$25 million, of which CIA costs were more than half. 9/ The second report, which commented on these issuances, pointed out that they were designed to meet different needs (for example, military issuances emphasized military matters), and that differences in classification made separate issuances necessary. 10/ These reports were forwarded to the President's Board, and the ad hoc committee was continued "for the purpose of studying the feasibility of establishing a joint intelligence daily."

The President's Board was apparently not overly impressed by the justification for the multiplicity of publications. On 5 August 1960 the Executive Secretary of the NSC wrote to the Secretary of Defense (with a copy to the DCI) saying that the President's Board had reported to the President:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

We believe that there is a continuing trend on the part of several member agencies of the Intelligence Community, particularly in the Department of Defense, to develop separate and duplicative capabilities in areas which should be handled on a joint, common concern basis under the auspices of USIB. We believe that this situation can be corrected readily by the exercise of a greater coordination role on the part of the Director of Central Intelligence and by a more complete implementation of the several recommendations which we have made to you previously on matters pertaining to the integration, coordination, and direction of the foreign intelligence effort. . . .

Inasmuch as the enclosed communication from the Director of Central Intelligence [the letter of the DCI to the Executive Secretary of the NSC - dated 20 July 1960 transmitting the final report of the USIB ad hoc Committee on Publications] does not include comments specifically directed to that part of the quoted recommendation which refers to the trend toward the development of separate and duplicate capabilities on the part of the intelligence agencies in the Department of Defense, it would be appreciated if you [the Secretary of Defense] would furnish your views and comments thereon to this office by September 8, 1960. . . 11/

Under date of 4 October 1960, the President's Board reported to the President and recommended that he direct the heads of Departments and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Agencies concerned to initiate immediate action to eliminate (a) unnecessary intelligence publications; (b) undesirable duplication in publications retained; and (c) unnecessary use of personnel and funds in preparing, printing, reproducing and distributing foreign intelligence publications and related issuances. 12/

The President approved the recommendation and requested the DCI (1) to refer the recommendation to the departments and agencies concerned and (2) to report the results to the President by 6 January 1961. 13/ On 9 January 1961, USIB approved a report to the President's Board which described what had been eliminated in the way of intelligence publications. 14/ In fact, only a few publications had been abolished. The ad hoc committee was dissolved at its own recommendation on 21 March 1961. On 18 April Dulles recommended to USIB members that any proposal for a new periodic publication by a member be coordinated by the Coordination Staff then functioning under the DCI, so as to avoid duplication. 15/ This was approved by USIB. 16/

This problem was one that continued to defy tidy solution. Departments or agencies did in fact

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

have different concerns; one service was interested in details and analysis which were of little concern to another. With the existence of unconventional techniques of collection, many of which called for a special clearance before access was permitted, documents of different classification covering the same general subject were unavoidable.

Aside from these objective factors, which tended toward a multiplicity of publications, there were understandable human factors which encouraged the same result. Responsible officers, whether military or civilian, liked to have their intelligence served up to them by people who knew their general interests, who understood their needs and shared their predilections, and whose principal purpose was to serve them. This was really a part of the problem of what constituted departmental intelligence. The very highest officials who had or were supposed to have had a more Olympian viewpoint may have been satisfied by intelligence which concerned itself with the whole national interest and they may have thought that one "coordinated" document was all

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

that was needed. An admiral in a command position, however, had a narrower field of primary concern. Then too, analysts working in a particular field had a natural urge to publish and to exhibit to readers what they were doing and what they had produced.

The effort to keep some kind of rein on the proliferation of publications was a continuing one. In a theoretical, perfect world, there would be no duplication. In practice, the problem was not solved, and the situation was, to use a popular phrase, "fluid."

#### Other Coordinated National Intelligence Publications

There were other coordinated publications which were the product of interagency consultation such as those put out by the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, the Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee, and the Economic Intelligence Committee. In addition there were those published by the ad hoc committees created by the USIB to deal with certain critical situations such as the Taiwan Strait in March 1955, the Arab-Israel confrontation in 1956, and the Berlin Crisis in 1960. Other issuances included those of other special groups

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

such as the ad hoc committee on East-West Exchanges..  
(28 February 1956).

In some cases, the procedures for the production of coordinated intelligence had been pretty well established and their acceptance by the other members of the community was achieved by the time Dulles became Director. This was particularly true with regard to national estimates. The old-line departments had in some cases been glad to have CIA take over burdensome chores and in other cases the initial distrust and jealousy which the infant CIA experienced in its earliest days had subsided if not virtually disappeared. When, however, it was proposed to centralize activities which other departments had carried on independently, bureaucratic reluctance and possessiveness reacted to impede progress. Such was the case with regard to the coordination of photographic and guided missiles intelligence. In these two areas serious problems arose, and it was in the solution to these problems that Dulles successfully reinforced the principles of coordination.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Photographic Intelligence

Whenever photography is available for intelligence exploitation, trained analysts who can extract intelligence are required. The art of photo-interpretation (PI) came of age during World War II, when photoreconnaissance became a significant source of intelligence. The armed services had staffs of photointerpreters charged with tasks of considerable importance, both tactical and strategic. Photointerpretation has also been widely used, of course, for civilian ends in peacetime mapping, agricultural planning, forestry surveys, and the like.

A formal proposal to create a photointerpretation unit in CIA was made by the Office of Research and Reports (ORR) in April 1953 and approved by the DCI in August of that year, after which steps were taken to establish a Photo Intelligence Division within the Geographical Research Area of ORR. Arthur C. Lundahl was chosen to head the unit, which consisted of six people when he transferred from the Navy Department in May 1953. The division addressed itself to the exploitation for intelligence purposes of the miscellaneous material available -- hand-held

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

camera photos, captured German material, photographs of Soviet-dominated areas taken on Air Force peripheral flights, and the meager products of the camera-carrying Genatrix balloons floated by the Air Force across the Soviet Union in the early 1950's.

In 1954, when the first plans for the U-2 project were taking shape, its director, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., called on Lundahl to plan for the exploitation of the photography to be obtained with the U-2. Lundahl organized the Photographic Interpretation Center, an independent, strictly compartmented photointerpretation unit for this purpose. Personnel were recruited, equipment procured or invented, and reference materials assembled. By the time the first U-2 photography became available in July 1956, the Center had moved into the Steuart Building at 5th and New York Ave. N.W., Washington, D. C., under rigorous security protection, and was ready to function.

The U-2 photography clearly was of major interest to the Armed Services, and from July 1956 on, both Army and Navy intelligence had PI detachments

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

located in the Center. These detachments were not part of an integrated organization, although there was a close working relationship between them and the CIA officers. The CIA unit, with assistance from the Army and Navy detachments, exploited photography on subjects of "national importance," that is, they conducted analysis on matters directly affecting the national security. The Air Force took no part in this exercise and insisted on doing its own exploitation.

There were a number of interrelated reasons for this situation. During this period, the Strategic Air Command (SAC) was clearly the most important factor on the US side of the balance of forces with the USSR. It was, until late in the 1950's, commanded by General Curtis LeMay, a dominant and powerful individual who was accustomed to having his own way. SAC, which carried great weight in the Air Force and in the Department of Defense, had built up at its Omaha headquarters a large intelligence organization which had considerable capabilities in photointerpretation; these, in fact, constituted the bulk of Air Force PI capabilities. U-2 photography

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

was a vital source of intelligence relating to SAC's strategic mission. It was of great value in targeting and in analyzing the Soviet air defense system. SAC had its own independent airborne reconnaissance operations which it wished to exploit. Furthermore, the number of trained photointerpreters available was limited, and SAC felt that it could not spare any PI resources from its Omaha unit to work with the new Center established by CIA. This was especially true in the months prior to the time when U-2 photography became available and during the early days of the U-2 flights.

For these reasons, SAC and General LeMay were not interested in having anyone else do their intelligence analysis. As has been said, General LeMay was a very powerful man and Air Force headquarters were greatly influenced by the positions SAC took -- as was evidenced in the controversies of the period over the estimates of the Soviet bomber and missile programs.

While each of the services as well as CIA had its own *departmental* interests and had since the beginning done photoanalysis for this purpose, the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

U-2 photography also was a prime source of *national* intelligence and as such was clearly within the responsibility of the DCI to produce coordinated national intelligence. Thus it would seem that this was a situation in which Dulles could well have forced the issue in an attempt to bring the Air Force into a coordinated production effort. He did not do so, however, at the time. One reason was probably his basic reluctance to try to resolve issues by confrontation; his preference was for trying to work things out by negotiation, even if such a course took a long time. In particular, Dulles may have hesitated to cross swords with so intransigent and powerful a person as General LeMay. General Cabell, who was intimately involved, both as DDCI and as an Air Force officer, commented to the writer in 1970, "Dulles recognized that it would be non-productive to challenge the Air Force insistence that the short supply of photointerpreters precluded Air Force participation in the otherwise joint effort."

In the latter part of 1960, after the U-2 flights over the Soviet Union were suspended in the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

aftermath of the shoot-down of Gary Power's plane on 1 May 1960, the first photography from satellites began to come in. This greatly increased the amount of material available. In December 1960, the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities (which was set up at a meeting on 6 May 1960 between the PBCFIA, the DCI, the Secretary of Defense, the - Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) made its report (the so-called Kirkpatrick Report) which recommended the creation of a national photointerpretation center under the management of CIA. This recommendation was approved by the National Security Council, which directed the DCI to set up the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) as a service of common concern. 17/ The NSC directive provided that

The Intelligence Board departments and agencies engaged in photographic intelligence production shall jointly provide appropriate personnel and other support for the Center, as agreed by them with the Director of Central Intelligence.

Further provisions specified that NPIC shall

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

not engage in the production and dissemination of finished intelligence

but

shall produce and disseminate NPIC photographic interpretation reports (based on an analysis of photography using other sources to assist in this interpretation).

It was further provided that

The intelligence chief of each department or agency represented on the U.S. Intelligence Board shall coordinate photographic intelligence activities within his parent organization with the National Photographic Interpretation Center.

When NPIC was established, the Air Force assigned a detachment with a coordinated exploitation mechanism for the first time. Exploitation was conducted, says an NPIC history of the period,\* by assigning Army, Navy, and Air Force interpreters to a joint team. "Extensive coordination," the history reported delicately, "was required to achieve approval of joint products produced." It was not until after DIA was formed in 1961 that personnel assigned from Defense to NPIC were effectively integrated into a

---

\* NPIC - History of the Johnson Years (in files of NPIC Historical Officer).

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

single working organization. The directive did not, of course, interfere with photointerpretation for departmental purposes by the various components of the community.

It may be argued that if Dulles had, pursuant to his general responsibility for coordination, insisted on an earlier integration of the photo-interpreting function, it would not have taken five years to accomplish what developed late in 1961. The slower process was in part the result of his reluctance to try to achieve by recourse to higher authority what he could accomplish over a longer period by persuasion or by demonstration of need or capability. The determining factors probably were the technical competence of the CIA Photographic Interpretation Center, acquired by years of experience and continuity and a realization by the services that resources beyond what they had at hand, such as economic analysis, were a necessary component of thorough exploitation. Until CIA had earned the acceptance of its ability, any attempt to integrate community efforts would have met with strong opposition or at least less

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

than full cooperation. It should also be noted that by 1961 the number and quality of photointerpreters had greatly improved, largely because of steps taken to meet the task of exploiting U-2 photography and the importance of the output of the photointerpreters.

#### Scientific Intelligence

The difficulties in establishing a method for producing coordinated scientific intelligence were well brought out in the middle 1950's in the field of guided missiles. Before that time, research and development work had been done on missiles, here and in the USSR, but not much was known about them, nor about what would be involved in the production of operational missile systems. Indeed, in the late 1940's, there was considerable question in technical circles as to whether the problems of guidance, fuel, and re-entry could be solved sufficiently to make a long-range missile system practicable.

When DCID 3/4, which dealt with the production of scientific and technical intelligence, went into effect on 14 August 1952, the Department of Defense was allocated primary responsibility for the pro-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

duction of intelligence on

all weapons, weapons systems, military equipment and techniques, plus intelligence on pertinent research and development leading to new military material and techniques....

Annex A to DCID 3/4 specifically included guided missiles in the above description. Although there was a guided Missiles Branch in the Weapons Division of the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI), it was small. 18/

On 29 January 1954, Dulles received a letter from the Administrator of the Federal Civil Defense Administration, Val Peterson, asking for an estimate of Soviet capabilities in guided missiles as a basis for civil defense planning. While recognizing that, at that time, bombers were the principal threat to the United States, he went on:

When the Soviet Union succeeds in developing a true Inter Continental Ballistic Missile of reasonable accuracy and capable of carrying an atomic warhead, all defense plans based on the detection and warning systems would have to be re-evaluated. If no effective warning can be expected, the civil defense problem cannot be met by relying on emergency dispersal of people, and must be re-examined from the ground up. . .

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I am, therefore, requesting you to furnish us an estimate of Soviet capabilities in the field of long-range guided missiles, giving your opinion on probable range and weight of the weapon and its accuracy of aim with at least a minimum date at which we can expect them to exist in operational numbers. While our main interest is in these long-range weapons, we would also like to have your latest estimate of Soviet progress in the shorter range missiles suitable for launching from submarines or surface ships, as well as developments in air-to-ground types. 19/

This letter was circulated to IAC members for consideration on 16 March 1954. 20/ No action was taken at that IAC meeting but there was some discussion.

The Navy representative (Admiral H. C. Daniel) and the Joint Staff representative (Colonel S. M.

Lansing) expressed the view that:

the subject [Soviet capabilities in guided missiles] was one allocated to the departments of the Department of Defense by DCID 3/4 and that to handle a matter primarily in the weapons field through the national intelligence machinery might lead to overcrowding an already overworked mechanism. General Trudeau [Army member] suggested that the entire community is concerned with at least the collection effort in this field, an effort which needs stepping up before existing estimates can be much improved.

General Samford [Air Force member] thought it desirable to respond as fully as

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

possible to present and future requestors involved with this subject. He doubted that less than a National Estimate would meet the need.

Mr. Dulles recognized that this subject had grown in importance since DCID 3/4 was issued almost two years ago and may require treatment different from that suggested in the Directive. He invited members to consider the matter further, pending a full discussion at a later meeting. 21/

On 26 March 1954 the Assistant Secretary of Defense (R&D), Donald A. Quarles, sent a memorandum to Dulles on the subject of a National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile capabilities and intentions. 22/ He said that he had reviewed the existing intelligence on the subject and had consulted the Armed Forces Policy Council. While the same information was available to all intelligence agencies, he said there was

considerable difference of opinion regarding the evaluation of this information. . . Further, there is little attention devoted to Soviet intentions in this field.

After discussing the need of the Department of Defense for a basis for planning, he went on:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I therefore recommend that the Intelligence Advisory Committee undertake preparation of a national intelligence estimate of Soviet capabilities and intentions to develop intercontinental ballistic missiles. . . I further recommend that the Intelligence Advisory Committee consider enlisting the assistance of a small group of highly qualified scientists and industrialists who can act as consultants to the Board of National Estimates in this effort.

This memorandum was sent to the IAC members on 29 March 1954.

Quarles obviously saw that the matter was beyond the scope of the intelligence components of the services, if only in the matter of intentions. It does not appear whether he was aware of the objections made by the Navy and the Joint Staff at the 16 March IAC meeting or whether, being aware of them, he did not share them.

At the IAC meeting on 30 March 1954, it was agreed:

to undertake a National Intelligence estimate on the status and future course of Soviet guided missile development. The Board of National Estimates will be augmented by scientific advisors and members were invited to nominate such advisors. The estimate's scope will include points raised by both FCDA and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Quarles, will initially be open-ended as to time covered and will be completed at a date judged realistic on the basis of further consideration by the Board of National Estimates.

Discussion: The Acting DCI [Gen. Cabell] felt that this subject was so important and embraced so many aspects of intelligence production that it should be treated on a broad rather than a narrower basis. It was recognized that the subject matter had major military implications and that the instant case would establish no precedent. 23/

The Secretary of the IAC had sent to General Cabell a draft of a longer version of the minutes quoted above which was more revealing than the final minutes in showing more of the discussion at the IAC meeting and thus more clearly what issues, largely bureaucratic, were at stake. The draft included the following paragraphs:

5. There was the suggestion that an ad hoc group, comparable to JAEIC, make the desired estimate for IAC review, but this was rejected on the grounds that the existing NIE machinery was entirely adequate. In any event, the IAC felt that it was premature to conclude that there is a requirement for a JAEIC-type mechanism in the guided missile field....

7. Tentative plans to create task teams for the science and technology, political, economic and strategic aspects of the estimate were outlined. In reply to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Mr. Armstrong's [State member] question as to the role of the SEC [the Scientific Estimates Committee, established by DCID 3/4 of 14 August 1952], it was suggested that the scientific-technical task team could perform this function. 24/

Thus the service opposition to a permanent IAC committee for guided missiles was surfaced at the meeting, though that opposition does not appear in the final minutes except as implied in General Cabell's comment about not setting a precedent. It seemed to him premature to make an issue at that time. 25/ No full-scale estimate on guided missiles had previously been attempted by anyone, although there had undoubtedly been collations of existing intelligence on the status of Soviet efforts made in the services and OSI. There was no clear unanimity within CIA as to how an estimate on this subject should be handled. At that time nuclear energy estimates were prepared by JAEIC with no participation by the Board of National Estimates. Both Dulles and Cabell probably believed that the most effective way to handle such an estimate would be more evident when one had been actually done.

Some time before the matter was discussed in

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

the IAC, various suggestions had been made within CIA as to procedures for handling Peterson's request. Dr. H. M. Chadwell, the AD/SI, had suggested in a memorandum to the DCI that he be named an ad hoc member of the Board of National Estimates, that the Board be augmented by a number of scientific consultants, and that the paper move through the normal NIE procedure with himself as chairman in charge of the estimate. 26/ He based this suggestion in part on the argument that it was impossible

to separate the long-term basic scientific and technological aspects of guided missiles from the military hardware aspects of missiles, particularly since most missiles are in the research and development stage rather than in the application stage at the present time.

Such a separation had been attempted in DCID 3/4 and sprang, of course, from the desire of the services to keep responsibility for important weapons intelligence functions. Chadwell also made the argument that it would take the resources of the entire community to treat such things as the impact of a missile program on the economy, matters of military doctrine and philosophy, and of "operational capabilities."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Before the second IAC meeting at which the matter was discussed, Chadwell had a change of mind and made an alternative proposal in a memorandum to the DCI dated 29 March 1954. 27/ It may have been that his attention was called to the fact that at that time JAEIC made nuclear energy estimates without any role for ONE. In any event, he suggested the creation of an IAC task force composed of Agency and departmental representatives and a variety of consultants, industrialists and scientists, who were to collate and evaluate all scientific and technical evidence. The work of this task force, which was referred to as an estimate, would be the basis for subsequent estimates done through the Office of National Estimates "to integrate the scientific and technical with other aspects of Soviet activities, e.g. economic, political, military, psychological, etc."

In the meantime, Sherman Kent, the Chairman of the Board of National Estimates (BNE), had sent a memorandum to General Cabell recommending that the board, augmented with the AD/SI and consultants, be

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

given the general responsibility for the estimate. He also suggested a series of subsidiary task teams to produce contributions to the estimate: (1) science and technology (to be chaired by the Chairman of JAEIC), (2) economics (to be chaired by the Chairman of the Economic Intelligence Committee [EIC]), (3) political matters (Chairman from State's OIR), and (4) strategic matters (Chairman from Defense).

Kent's proposal seems to have been adopted. Because of the many military implications of the subject of the estimate, General Harold Bull, a member of the Board, was put in charge of the matter, and Kent had Defense provide the Chairman for the task team to deal with "strategic matters." 28/ After two weeks of meetings and exchanges of memoranda, terms of reference for the estimate were agreed upon and there were set up a steering committee and an elaborate series of other committees to make contributions. A timetable was worked out with an IAC target date of 5 October 1954.

One of the basic questions in an estimate would be "How many missiles would the Soviets want?"

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

While no one could answer this question definitively, it did seem as if it were one on which a military view would be most desirable. The BNE was new in the missile field and felt some diffidence in dealing with such matters. Consequently, the Board asked the Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their views. Their operations officers estimated the targets the Soviets would probably like to cover and made an estimate of the number of missiles the Soviets would like to have.

Apparently it was expected that the contributions of the specialized task teams (military requirements, Soviet production, and support capabilities, etc.) would be used pretty much intact and that ONE would, on the basis of these contributions, draft the overall estimate. Industrialists and scientists were in fact brought in, and the FBI was asked to make a contribution on Soviet espionage efforts against a list of US guided missile plants and installations. The FBI produced a 21-page contribution with charts. A draft estimate was ready by 31 August 1954, 29/ went through the ONE coordination process, and was

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

approved by the IAC and published as NIE 11-6-54 on 5 October 1954, the target date.

This is not the place to evaluate the estimate in detail. It should be said, however, that this elaborate mechanism produced an estimate that was surprisingly valid considering the paucity of hard intelligence. It must be remembered that there was only sketchy overhead photography; no Penkovsky papers; only the normal run of attache reports, and debriefings of defectors and of Germans who had worked in the USSR; and what now seems scanty SIGINT. Although estimates on surface-to-air and shorter range missiles underestimated Soviet progress and the idea of cruise missiles on small ships was not explored, the forecasts of ICBM progress were remarkably good.

An extensive postmortem to specify intelligence gaps was worked on during the last phases of the coordination process. It was not formally approved by the IAC, however, until February 1955, having been held in abeyance until the completion of a Guided Missiles Intelligence Conference held [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] late in 1954.

The experience of preparing this estimate had convinced Dulles that the matter of guided missiles intelligence had to be handled on a community-wide basis and that therefore DCID 3/4 had to be revised so as to provide for a separate Guided Missiles Intelligence Committee (GMIC) of the IAC, comparable to JAEIC. A memorandum was circulated to the IAC members on 8 February 1955 asking that representatives of the IAC members meet to discuss a proposed DCID to establish a GMIC. 30/ The memorandum stated that the preparation of NIE 11-6-54 had "demonstrated serious deficiencies in our intelligence" and that guided missiles had been placed in the highest priority of National Intelligence Objectives.

The representatives met and apparently went over the same arguments as had been voiced when the project for the estimate was discussed. On 31 May 1955 a memorandum was circulated to the IAC which had attached to it proposed terms of reference for a GMIC. 31/ The memorandum said that at the meetings of the representatives no agreement had been reached and that "the urgency of this matter, in the opinion

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of the DCI, is such that discussion should be reopened by the IAC members."

The subject was discussed at length at the 14

June IAC meeting:

a. The Chairman [Dulles] stressed the importance to the security of the U.S. of doing everything possible to improve intelligence in guided missiles. He stated that he would not wish to take the responsibility for not going forward with some community approach which was responsive to the need. He further stated that he realized that the suggested draft [of a proposed DCID 3/6] was not the only way to get at the problem and that he was more anxious to press for the principle of inter-agency cooperation in this field than for the details of the present proposal.

b. The Service members generally took exception in principle to the proposed draft as an invasion of the weapons field now allocated to the services under DCID 3/4. Moreover, they tended to view the key gap in the field of guided missiles intelligence as collection. This has been given a high priority by the services and it is not clear how the establishment of another committee would improve current efforts.

c. The Air Force member referred to the Air Force program to attack the problem more broadly and indicated that while collection was an important aspect of the problem, there also were possibilities in the field of research and analysis. He suggested that an alternative to setting

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

up a new committee would be to broaden the charter of the Scientific Estimates Committee. 32/

The State and FBI members did not take any positive position. The AEC representative was in favor of the proposal, saying that:

his agency has been pleased with the JAEIC approach to an important problem and he felt that the establishment of a GMIC might help AEC augment its contribution in this field. He believed that the biggest gain would be in the development of new techniques and methods for exploiting intelligence in this field.

2. The Chairman [Dulles] and General Cabell reiterated that the proposal was in no way designed to supersede individual efforts but to give them added impetus. Mr. Kent [CIA] pointed out that under the present setup it is not clear who takes the action called for in agreed post mortem findings in this field. The pulling together of all individual efforts is thus left largely undone.

f. Action. The IAC deferred action on the draft directive pending the receipt in 2 weeks of a report prepared by the SEC in coordination with the EIC. The SEC report is to include a proposal of how the objectives of the draft DCID could be met by SEC, the changes in SEC's charter which an assumption of this responsibility would entail, and an evaluation of current Air Force efforts in the field of guided missiles intelligence. 33/

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

The SEC did prepare a report dated 5 July 1955 in which it was stated:

It is the considered opinion of the SEC that, by further emphasizing and expanding in certain ways its coordination effort in guided missiles intelligence, it can fulfill the objectives of the proposed DCID 3/6 through existing organizations and mechanisms and by establishing ad hoc sub-committees as required. 34/

Even though this proposal would obviate a GMIC, it was not acceptable to the services. This paragraph was footnoted:

The Joint Staff and Navy members, being of the opinion that the subject paper reflects too broad a concept of coordination of the field of guided missile intelligence, take exception to the inclusion, implied or otherwise, of such power of coordination by the SEC, and are of the opinion that only the scientific and technological phases of guided missiles intelligence can be undertaken without a major revision of DCID 3/4.

The SEC was instructed to coordinate its report with the EIC. This proved to be impossible and the EIC also filed a report which said in part:

2. The production of intelligence in the Soviet guided missile program will require increasing emphasis on the economic aspects of these activities, which in turn will depend on a broad and detailed knowledge of the Soviet in-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

dustrial structure and of the large number of industries necessary to support the production of guided missiles. The EIC believes that as the primary competence of the SEC is in the field of scientific and technical intelligence, it would not be an appropriate body for the overall coordination of the Soviet guided missile intelligence including its economic aspects. (Footnote: The Department of State representative believes that since the guided missile intelligence problem is at present essentially a problem of scientific and technical intelligence, the SEC is, at least for the time being, the most appropriate body for the overall coordination of guided missile intelligence, including the economic aspects.)

3. Although the members of the EIC are not in agreement regarding the advisability of establishing at this time a committee for the overall coordination of the intelligence effort in the field of Soviet guided missiles, the EIC believes that if such a body were to be established, it should include adequate representation from the economic intelligence community. (Footnote: The Army, Navy, Air Force and JIG representatives believe there is no requirement for the establishment of such a coordinating committee; the Department of State and CIA representatives hold the opposite view. 35/

Thus the whole problem was back where it started.

CIA and State, with AEC support, favored a GMIC or at least one interagency committee with overall

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

responsibility for guided missiles intelligence, whereas the services and Joint Staff held out for Defense responsibility.\* It might have seemed that the issue was sufficiently well drawn to warrant recourse to the NSC under the procedures set out in NSCID 1. Dulles did not, however, follow this course.

The IAC at its meeting on 12 July 1955 considered setting up another committee to try to reach agreement, an ad hoc guided missiles intelligence investigating committee

for the purpose of investigating and evaluating the status of the national guided missiles intelligence program and reporting to the IAC fully by 15 October 1955. The mission of the *ad hoc* Committee will be to investigate, evaluate and recommend to the IAC on the status of coordination, emphasis, guidance, and coverage now existent in the national guided missiles intelligence program, and the degree that continuing cognizance should be exercised over these activities in the future by an IAC committee or existing committees.

Such an ad hoc committee was agreed upon a week later. 36/

---

\* CIA did not ease the atmosphere by having promoted the Guided Missiles Branch of the Weapons Division of OSI to the status of a separate division on 29 March 1955.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The result of this exercise could have been foreseen. The ad hoc committee produced a split report in which the service representatives -- Army, Navy, Air Force, Joint Staff, and NSA -- in general said everything could and should be handled by existing means. 37/ State, AEC, and CIA recommended a GMIC and produced a revised term of reference. This was discussed at the IAC on 13 December 1955. Excerpts from the minutes follow:

b. Admiral Layton [Joint Staff], supported by Admiral Espe [Navy] and General Gaither [Army] took the position that under existing NSC directives, guided missile intelligence, being intelligence on weapons, fell clearly within the responsibility of the Department of Defense. In short, that guided missile intelligence is departmental intelligence. He further expressed the view that the creation of an IAC subcommittee on guided missiles was not the answer to what is basically a collection problem.

c. General Samford [Air Force] stated that, based on the experience of the Air Force as the primary collector of guided missile intelligence, he believed that there was merit in the idea of a coordinated community approach. This approach had demonstrated its value in the field of atomic energy intelligence.

d. Mr. Dulles expressed the view that guided missile intelligence was national

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

intelligence of the highest priority, probably of even greater ultimate importance to our national security than atomic energy intelligence. A concerted attack on the problem by the community, under the guidance of an IAC guided missile committee is therefore essential if he and the community are to discharge their responsibilities under existing NSC directives.

e. It was agreed that Mr. Dulles would draw up his views for presentation to the National Security Council under the procedure provided in NSCID No. 1, paragraph 3a. 38/

The NSCID 1 paragraph referred to required that the DCI:

in making recommendations or giving advice to the National Security Council pertaining to intelligence activities . . . transmit therewith a statement indicating the concurrence or non-concurrence of the members of the Intelligence Advisory Committee; provided that, when unanimity is not obtained among the Department heads of the Department of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence shall refer the problem to the Secretary of Defense before presenting it to the National Security Council.

Since there had not been unanimity among the services, Dulles addressed a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense which reviewed the long efforts to reach agreement on the setting up of a GMIC and stated the DCI's firmly held view of the necessity

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

for such a committee.

In a relatively short time, the Secretary of Defense, Charles E. Wilson, sent a return memorandum saying that he agreed

completely with you as to the importance of our intelligence effort on the Soviet guided missile program. I also concur in your recommendation to establish a Guided Missile Intelligence Sub-committee of the Intelligence Advisory Committee with functions similar to those of the existing Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee.

I am sorry that I did not know of this matter sooner and I hope that where disagreement of this type occurs in the future...you will bring the matter to my early attention . . . My agreement with you will obviate the necessity for discussing the matter before the National Security Council. 39/

Proposed terms of reference for a GMIC were circulated to the IAC on 13 January 1956, 40/ in revised form on 24 January, and approved as Annex D to DCID 3/4 on 31 January. 41/ The GMIC was in existence. Its name was expanded to GMAIC (to include Astronautics) and its charter became a new DCID 3/4 on 3 February 1959.

One minor point may be worth making. The terms of reference of GMIC as drafted by the ad hoc guided

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

missiles intelligence investigating committee provided that the GMIC should be responsible for the "review and coordination of intelligence on guided missiles produced to serve as contributions to National Intelligence Estimates and National Intelligence Surveys."

The proposed terms of reference sent by Dulles to Wilson had changed this language to read:

Preparing coordinated drafts of National Estimates on guided missile intelligence and producing appropriate contributions in this field of intelligence for other national intelligence estimates as requested.

This version was the one which was circulated to the IAC. The revised form, which was approved on 31 January 1956, read, "Preparing coordinated contributions in the field of guided missile intelligence for national intelligence estimates." (The language about preparing coordinated drafts of estimates had disappeared.) In this respect these terms of reference differed from those of JAEIC which, in their revision dated 24 January 1956, retained the language of "preparing coordinated drafts of national estimates...." 42/

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Both were revised in 1959, and each committee was assigned the nominal duty "to produce (1) drafts of national intelligence estimates, (2) contributions to national intelligence estimates, . . . " Thus it took at least from 16 March 1954, when the response to the Civil Defense Administrator's request was discussed in IAC, to 31 January 1956 to establish the principle of coordinated community production of guided missiles intelligence. During that interval of almost two years, the services (other than the Air Force, whose Chief of Intelligence, General Samford, expressed sympathy for the community approach although his subordinates did not) clung to the wording of the old DCID 3/4, namely, the position that guided missile intelligence was departmental intelligence.

The exercise of producing NIE 11-6-54, with the elaborate structure of task teams dealing with economics, electronics, geodesy, nuclear energy, espionage, and a host of other subjects, would seem to have shown that the production of finished guided missile intelligence required the cooperation

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

of all components of the community. The services undoubtedly had accepted the use of the NIE form because it had been requested by Quarles, an important Assistant Secretary of Defense. They must have realized that, if they opposed the use of the estimates machinery, they would be overruled, as indeed they were by the Secretary of Defense in January 1956.

But clearly the service intelligence chiefs were unhappy about the outcome of the struggle. Soon after the matter was formally settled and steps taken to organize GMIC as an IAC subcommittee, there arose the question of the chairmanship. Dulles, characteristically wishing to ruffle no more military feathers and smooth out those presently in disarray, moved to award the chairmanship to the military. The matter of which service and which particular officer of that service should receive the title, he left to his military colleagues. What went on in their private deliberations is not known, but the fact that the Air Force won the right to make the nomination and that the Air Force put up an officer is a matter of record. The name of George Wilson, an Air Force major, went to the DCI as

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

the service choice. Dulles accepted the nomination.

One hesitates to say more lest what follows might be held as personally derogatory of Wilson. It is not so intended, for he was an able and pleasant officer. At about that point his qualifications for the office ended abruptly. He was by no means a long-term intelligence officer, let alone a technical specialist in Soviet missile weaponry, and he was many years and two or three grades junior in rank to the demands of the job. Thus the services showed their displeasure at the settlement and made what contribution they could to its not working.

Time, the healer, proved itself the match of even this situation. Later (probably as much as a year later) Major Wilson was transferred out of the job, and his successor -- another Air Force officer -- had the presence, knowledge, and rank that Wilson lacked. Under Colonel Earl McFarland GMIC (later, GMAIC) became a going organization with the backing of the hitherto reluctant military. It was not until after McCone became Director that the chairmanship was assigned to the Director of OSI, an officer directly responsible to the DCI.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

In retrospect, it would seem that if Dulles had been willing to force the issue and start the procedure of going to the NSC, the service position would have collapsed. The referral of the problem to an ad hoc investigating committee, and then to the SEC, may have been his way of giving the services a graceful way of abandoning their position -- an opportunity which the Army, Navy, and Joint Staff did not take.\* An additional reason for the delay appears in a memorandum sent by the AD/SI (Chadwell) to the DCI on 13 June 1955. 43/ Part of this memorandum is a resume of background information which says "The DDCI felt that this item (DCID 3/6) should not be juggled simultaneously with the ELINT problem. Therefore, the CIA strategy adopted was to reopen this subject after the ELINT problem was settled." The basic

---

\* General Cabell said to the writer in 1970 that he and Dulles discussed the tactics to be followed to achieve what both thought an important result, i.e., the creation of a GMIC. They concluded that if they tried to force the issue to the NSC, the Pentagon would succeed in having the proposal turned down. "This was a wrong estimate," General Cabell said, "but it was the one we made."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

memorandum of 15 March 1955 says "Since the ELINT problem is now in hand. . ." so this reason for delay had evaporated.

The question arises as to why there had not been a comparable problem in relation to nuclear energy intelligence. The answer appears to be quite simple. With the passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, the Manhattan Engineering District (MED), which had had full charge of everything relating to atomic energy, was dissolved and the AEC organized. General Groves, the commander of the MED, transferred his Foreign Intelligence Branch to the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) under General Vandenberg on 25 February 1947. Under the CIG, a Joint Nuclear Energy Intelligence Committee was set up which functioned as an intelligence coordination mechanism until 1949 under Directive 9 of the National Intelligence Authority. When on 28 October 1949 a Scientific Intelligence Committee was set up under the IAC by DCID 3/3, JNEIC became a subcommittee of the SIC, with the name of JAEIC. In 1952, the revised DCID 3/4 of 14 August 1952 "reconstituted" JAEIC as a subcommittee

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of IAC. Thus, nuclear energy intelligence had never been assigned to the military services. 44/

The delineation of the steps leading up to the creation of GMIC and the references to the preparation of estimates by JAEIC also raise the question as to how effective these mechanisms were in the production of coordinated intelligence. This was not their only function, of course. Each was charged with a variety of responsibilities, such as determining intelligence deficiencies and the working up of collection requirements. JAEIC played a major role in relations with the Congressional Joint Atomic Energy Committee and provided a useful mechanism for channeling community relationships with nuclear research centers such as the Livermore and Lawrence Laboratories and Los Alamos. Perhaps their greatest usefulness was to provide a clearing-house for information and a forum for discussion and the exchange of ideas. So long as the representatives on such committees were technically competent and the subjects considered were technical in nature, both JAEIC and GMIC served important functions.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

This was particularly true in the period when the subjects they dealt with were novel and when there was no established body of knowledge, understanding, and experience shared by a number of experts. Such a period for nuclear energy lasted until well into the 1950's, and with guided missiles into the 1960's.

Quite aside from their intrinsic usefulness, they were necessary for what might be called political reasons. Both nuclear energy and guided missiles were subjects of serious moment to the United States Government. The vision of the various members of the community going their separate ways, with different technical abilities, different approaches, and differing biases, and reaching different conclusions makes one shudder. While it is probable that agreed findings or conclusions by JAEIC or GMIC often hid disagreement either through fuzzy language or by resorting to the least common denominator device, they were undoubtedly far better than a series of unrelated and contradictory findings and conclusions.

The peculiar situation with regard to nuclear

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

weapons, where the responsibility for atomic energy intelligence had been assigned to CIA, was quite different from any other weapons system. In this case, and in the case of guided missiles, a mechanism which brought the various agencies into continuous intimate contact when dealing with technical intelligence matters was indispensable if conflict and bitterness were to be avoided. The rivalries and ambitions of the services in the developing field of guided missiles would have spilled over into their treatment of intelligence, just as it had a few years before spilled over into the field of intelligence on bombers; each service had found in the available intelligence a warrant for its own policy predilections. A forum in which participants would try to reach a common agreed technical evaluation would reduce the number of divergent views which could otherwise be expected.

When it came to the translation of Soviet technical capabilities into estimates of what the Soviets were likely to do, the technical committees were less adequate, and the working out of a more

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

satisfactory procedure for the making of such estimates became necessary.\*

Since at least 1950, JAEIC or its predecessor, had been preparing semiannual papers for the IAC which were labelled "Semi-Annual Estimate of the Status of the Soviet Atomic Energy Program." 45/ These documents, which were referred to in the transmittal memoranda of the IAC Secretariat sometimes as "estimates", sometimes as "reports", were in fact status reports, not estimates of future developments. They were not discussed in the IAC but were approved by telephone, sometimes with changes. NIE 65 published 16 June 1953 on "Soviet Bloc Capabilities through 1957" had a section on Soviet progress in nuclear weapons, with estimates on the number of fission weapons the USSR could have during the period of the estimate, and some language on the development of thermonuclear weapons. These sections were

---

\* Reference is made only to the Soviets in this study since it was not until around 1959-60 that concern about the Chinese advanced weapons program became active.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

brief and part of a general estimate prepared in the aftermath of Stalin's death in March 1953. The estimate was apparently prepared through the normal NIE procedure, with JAEIC presumably making the contribution on nuclear weapons.

The first formal estimate specifically addressed to the Soviet nuclear energy program was NIE 11-3-54, published 16 February 1954. This estimate was drafted by JAEIC and submitted directly to the IAC for final approval without any participation by ONE or the Board of National Estimates. The estimate carried a notation that it was prepared by JAEIC, as did all the estimates on the Soviet Atomic Energy Program through 1961 (the NIE 11-2 series). The *History of OSI*, prepared in OSI, after referring to the procedure just described, comments,

In consideration of the fact that to that time the Soviet program was pre-dominantly in the research and development phase, the JAEIC sinecure [sic] did not appear unreasonable to the operating heads of the intelligence community. 46/

It goes on to say

Though Sherman Kent [Chairman of the Board of National Estimates] had first raised questions about the propriety of JAEIC's responsibility for

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

the NIE in 1953, [presumably during the preparation of NIE 11-3-54] it was not until December 1955, that the IAC approved a modification of the JAEIC charter. The procedure for handling the Soviet Atomic Energy NIE was regularized at the same time.

It was shortly after NIE 11-3-54 (on the Soviet nuclear energy program) was approved that the IAC and various parts of CIA were addressing themselves to the problem of responding to the request for an NIE on Soviet guided missiles (as discussed above). That exercise brought out clearly that considerations of policy, economics, and technological abilities were necessary ingredients of a thoughtful estimate, and the elaborate series of task groups to prepare parts of NIE 11-6-54 (on Soviet guided missiles) was set up. The analogy between that estimate and the atomic energy estimates was plain. Under date of 24 January 1955, Sherman Kent, the AD/NE, sent a memorandum to Dr. Paul Eckel of the IG Staff urging a broader treatment of the Atomic energy estimate than had obtained in the case of NIE 11-3-54. 47/ He made the point that the matter was no longer one solely of science and technology, that future develop-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ments would be guided by such factors as the economic impact, strategic plans, and the competing claims of other industries. 48/ In the spring of 1955, the DDI, Robert Amory, recommended to the DDCI that the Board of National Estimates participate in the preparation of estimates regarding atomic energy and said that the DDCI (General Cabell) agreed. OSI, however, proposed that it should continue to prepare the NIE's, all the while augmenting its own capabilities by bringing in the help of other CIA components, particularly ORR. 49/

In 1955 JAEIC, under the chairmanship of Dr. Herbert Scoville, who had become AD/SI on 13 September, prepared so-called terms of reference for JAEIC, to be added to DCID 3/4 as Annex C. It will be recalled that DCID 3/4 in its 14 August 1952 version had merely, in Sec. 1.e. (1), "reconstituted" JAEIC "as a permanent interdepartmental committee with the same structure and functions as before." The proposed new terms of reference described JAEIC's mandate in detail and, as submitted by JAEIC, read in part: "f. Preparing for the IAC national in-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

telligence estimates in the field of atomic energy." This would confirm JAEIC's position without qualification and, indeed, could be read as a delegation of final authority for such estimates by the IAC to JAEIC. The terms of reference were approved by the IAC on 20 December 1955 (issued 24 January 1958) but with paragraph f. changed to read

Preparing coordinated drafts of national estimates on atomic energy intelligence and producing appropriate scientific contributions in this field of intelligence for other national intelligence estimates as requested. 50/

Thus the IAC confirmed JAEIC's function of preparing draft estimates on atomic energy.

The matter did not remain settled, however. There does not seem to be documentary evidence on the subject, but it is the memory of those who were in ONE that about 1957 the estimates prepared by JAEIC were, on orders of Dulles, submitted to the Board of National Estimates for review before being sent to the IAC. This review was designed to improve the form of presentation, particularly the conclusions, so that they would be more understandable to nontechnical readers. In addition, ONE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

raised matters of substance with the Chairman of JAEIC and changes were made. This was the procedure which had been recommended to the DCI by the DDI in 1955. 51/

On 24 November 1958 there was a meeting in General Cabell's office to consider a revision of the charters of both GMIC and JAEIC. There were present Dulles (for part of the meeting), Cabell (DDCI), Truscott (DD/C), Scoville (AD/SI), Guthe (AD/RR), Kent (AD/NE), Cooper (DAD/NE), and a few others. 52/ The purpose of the meeting was to examine the role of ONE in the production of estimates on Soviet capabilities in technical fields, particularly atomic energy and guided missiles. Before the group was a proposal by Kent, which he had previously discussed with Cabell, that JAEIC and GMIC prepare contributions to be used as the basis for such estimates. He proposed that the contributions could be published separately as National Intelligence Reports. Dulles made a number of comments, only two of which embodied clear decisions:

- (1) He was opposed to the issuance of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

two papers on the same subject, even if their titles were different.

(2) He desired that the Board of National Estimates participate in the preparation of any estimate prior to its submission to the Intelligence Board.

It was not clear what Dulles had in mind as to the procedure for the preparation of NIE's or the role of the Board of National Estimates. Some participants, not surprisingly including Kent and Cooper, thought he would like to have the estimate in three parts: (1) conclusions and a summary prepared by ONE, (2) a discussion also prepared in ONE, and (3) an annex consisting of the JAEIC report. Others, including Scoville, thought that the DCI wanted an estimate consisting of the JAEIC report plus a summary and conclusions prepared by the Board of National Estimates.

Cooper found the difference between these two alternatives important in that the second of them would confine discussions of economics, policy, strategy, and the like, to members of JAEIC alone. The first alternative, in providing for a discussion section prepared under the auspices of the Board of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

National Estimates, would give an opportunity for bringing others into the consideration of non-technical factors. There is no record that this difference of opinion was formally resolved. Scoville, in order to accommodate some of the points made by the ONE representatives, suggested that ONE assign a member of its staff to work with JAEIC in the early stages of drafting. He said he would forward initial versions of the draft to ONE and would welcome early preliminary drafts of conclusions to guide JAEIC. 53/

The terms of reference of both JAEIC and GMAIC were revised in early 1959 at the time when all DCID's were reviewed after the revisions of the NSCID's that were carried out under Truscott in 1958. At that time the two committees were brought into line by assigning to each the task of producing "drafts of national intelligence estimates . . . [and] contributions to national intelligence estimates . . . ." This was the wording which had been applied to JAEIC since 1956 but not to GMAIC; now they were equal. The fact is, however, that in both cases the actual

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

movement was towards integrating these scientific estimates into the regular procedures of the Board of National Estimates. Despite the changed language, GMAIC never attempted to produce whole drafts of estimates for submission to the USIB as JAEIC did.

JAEIC prepared the draft of NIE 11-2-59 for submission to USIB, but Scoville, in his briefing memorandum to the DCI said that the draft had been approved by JAEIC, that the Board of National Estimates and the Webster Panel (of consultants) were in agreement, and that certain changes that the Board and Panel had suggested had been incorporated.

One important factor which contributed to the tendency to move the nuclear estimates out of the hands of the technical experts into the general procedure for preparing estimates was the diminishing importance of measuring the Soviet capacity for producing nuclear materials. At the beginning of the Soviet nuclear weapons program, the limiting factor for the Soviets was the availability of plutonium and U-235, essential components of nuclear weapons. A major part of the US intelligence effort

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

was aimed at uncovering Soviet production capacity. This capacity had to be deduced by technical analyses, such as the measurement of radioactive krypton in the atmosphere (which was a measure of plutonium separation), photography of plants, scientific analysis of objects obtained from the vicinity of suspected installations, and the like. These had to be handled by those who could understand and evaluate the results of such analyses. The importance to the estimate of Soviet capabilities of the availability of nuclear materials and the amounts of material needed for specific warheads was brought out clearly when efforts were made to produce sample allocations of estimated available material as between various weapons systems. Since the quantity estimated to be available was far less than required for all the weapons the various services estimated to exist, there was keen competition in the allocation procedure. Providing nuclear warheads for all the postulated bombs, missiles, torpedos, and mines, would have taken many times the available fissionable material.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Thus while JAEIC concerned itself with the production of material and the analysis of test devices, it was only too glad to leave to the ordinary estimating process -- meaning ONE -- the production of sample allocations. While JAEIC prepared the draft of NIE 11-2-58 (The Soviet Atomic Energy Program, published 14 January 1958), the Annex (Possible Soviet Allocations of Fissionable Material to Weapons Stockpiles, 1958-62) was prepared through ONE and not published until 30 September 1958.

As the Soviet capacity to produce fissionable material increased and the cumulative production figures became larger, the availability of material became less and less a limiting factor, and the amount of material needed for a particular warhead became less critical. The important estimates were in the field of the size and mix of weapons required by strategic concepts and doctrine.

The estimates on Soviet military capabilities and intentions were meanwhile undergoing a change. Largely at the initiative of Howard Stoertz of the ONE Soviet staff, and in response to changes in US force planning in Defense, a different sorting out

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of the military estimates was developed over the course of the late 1950's and early 1960's. The general estimate of Soviet military intentions and capabilities, the old 11-4 series, had become unwieldy and took an inordinately long time to produce. Gradually there emerged a series of separate estimates dealing with capabilities for strategic attack, air and missile defense, general purpose forces, and the like. These estimates required consideration of many non-scientific matters, such as economic capacity and priorities as well as internal and foreign policy considerations. The strictly technical estimates became fewer; separate estimates on guided missiles were dropped after 1961 after having gone through a phase of being limited specifically to "technical capabilities" in NIE 11-5-61. The subject of missiles proliferated into a series of weapons systems with different purposes (such as strategic attack, air and ABM defense, general-purpose forces). The 11-2 series on the nuclear program remained, in all probability, because the Congressional Joint Atomic Energy Committee expected it.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

There is some evidence that another factor was at work. It is said by some who were concerned with the nuclear and guided missiles estimates in the pre-1962 period that the process of matching estimated warheads to estimated missiles resulted in exaggerated estimates of weapons systems. It was the tendency of those working on missiles to estimate the largest reasonably possible payload for each missile considered. It was the corresponding tendency of the nuclear experts to allocate to such missile payloads the most powerful warhead that could reasonably be possible. This would result in a "worst case" estimate, such as an estimate that MRBM's targeted on British airfields had a yield of some two megatons. While this was theoretically possible, it did not make much sense and, in fact, articles in the new Soviet journal *Military Thought* procured by Penkovsky and known by the code name *Ironbark*, revealed that such MRBM's had warheads of some 35 kilotons. It was said, though documentation to support it does not appear available, that the Net Evaluation Sub-Committee of the NSC was

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

dissatisfied with these "worst case" estimates.

Whether or not these two last-mentioned factors were in fact operative, the most important change was the movement from estimating the largest technically feasible weapons systems towards estimating the most likely assortment of weapons, a movement which pushed the estimating task more and more towards the nontechnical procedures followed for other estimates, i.e. towards ONE. At any rate, McCone, shortly after becoming DCI at the end of 1961, ruled that all estimates should go through the ONE procedure. 54/

#### ELINT

In the still-short history of US scientific intelligence it may be said that the development of few fields has been accompanied by more pulling and hauling, internal and external to CIA, than that of ELINT.

So states the history of OSI, written in 1969. 55/  
It is certainly true that ELINT is a good example of an intelligence activity which appeared to require coordination of the practical as well as the bureaucratic hurdles that stood in the way, both inside

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

and outside of CIA, and of the long time needed to set up a framework for coordination. Even today- (1973), there remain areas of obscurity and differing interpretation in matters of who should do what, and the effectiveness of the coordinating mechanism is by no means clear.

One murky question was "What is ELINT?" The answer given by the NSC is that ELINT consists of

the collection (observation and recording) and the technical processing for later intelligence purposes, of information on foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than atomic detonation sources. 56/

This definition, which is virtually unchanged today, leaves many uncertainties.\* As Charles A. Kroger, Jr., points out in his article, "ELINT, A Scientific Intelligence System," 57/ the whole electromagnetic spectrum ranges from electric power at one end, through the radio and TV frequencies, radiated heat, visible light, ultra-violet, X-rays and gamma rays, to cosmic rays. ELINT, for intelligence purposes, actually concerns itself with certain radiations in what Kroger calls the radio-wave part of the

---

\* Even today (1973) there are differences of opinion as to whether "ELINT" stands for Electronic Intelligence or Electronic Intercept.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

spectrum, from "very low frequency" through "extremely high frequency." In general, communications intelligence (COMINT) covers the exploitation of radiations carrying encrypted or plaintext word messages, while ELINT deals with the rest of this part of the spectrum, including radar, telemetry, radio beacons, and the like. Any definition is, of course, arbitrary, and the more generalized term of signals intelligence (SIGINT) is in many cases a more useful term, avoiding some of the problems raised by attempts at more precise definition. It does not, however, help resolve the practical differences between COMINT and ELINT, i.e., the way security is handled, who engages in its collection and processing, and the funds and attention devoted to each. It is these problems that made the difficulties requiring coordination.

COMINT, the interception and analysis of human messages, had, of course, long been a source of great intelligence significance. CIA had only a minor operational role in COMINT activities, though it was an important consumer of the product. Further-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

more, it was directly concerned with COMINT by reason of the fact that the DCI was chairman (albeit nonvoting) of the US Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB), and in addition CIA was a member of that Board.\* The structure and operational arrangements for carrying out COMINT activities had been pretty well developed after NSA was formed in 1952 to consolidate the security agencies of the services.

ELINT, in the form of the interception and analysis of radar and of guidance beacons, had become of major concern to the armed forces during and after World War II. The British had been pioneers in this field and had an active, if small, program which they called "noise listening." The potentialities of ELINT as a means of understanding technical developments in the USSR were recognized early in CIA, particularly in OSI. Starting in 1951, this office was the channel for giving assistance to the British program, and a start was made in building up a substantive competence in the field. Further-

---

\* The overall responsibility for COMINT policy had been given to USCIB by NSCID 9 of 29 December 1952.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

more, officers in OSI -- in particular, James Sears, George Miller, and Ralph Clark -- were zealous missionaries propounding the intelligence value of ELINT. Impetus to CIA's interest was given in 1953 when the NSC, in NSC 169, gave CIA the task of evaluating Soviet and Satellite capabilities for jamming radio signals.

The interest of CIA was in new and unusual signals, which would indicate research and development, rather than in electronic order of battle (O/B), which was then the primary concern of the services, particularly the Air Force. Close working relations were established on an informal basis with the components of the services, particularly the Army and Navy, which were engaged in ELINT activities. (The Air Force seems to have shied away from cooperation and exchange of information in this field, perhaps because so many of its activities were outside Washington.)

By 1953 the Agency was involved in ELINT deeply enough to warrant an ELINT program of its own, and an Agency ELINT Task Force was established to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

formulate a suitable Agency-wide plan. On 29 May 1954 Dulles approved the first Agency ELINT program. 58/

There was need for an Agency program because within CIA a variety of components were involved: DDP through clandestine collection activities and its role in intelligence liaison in foreign countries, OSI through its responsibility for analysis and evaluation of the material collected, and the Office of Communications through its role in the design and production of collection and processing equipment in cooperation with OSI and the DDP technical services. An Agency ELINT Staff Officer was named. He was for many years a member of the staff of OSI and had the duty of coordinating Agency activities. The diversity of the interests was such, however, that much had to be done at the level of the DCI's office. General Cabell, the DDCI, took on this responsibility since such matters were neither particularly congenial to Dulles nor within the field of his talents. Thus much of the history of ELINT during the Dulles administration of CIA, both internally and in the community, revolved around

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Cabell's office. The Agency ELINT Staff Officer was de facto attached to the DDCI's office, even though he was technically in OSI.

The scope and nature of the Agency ELINT program is set out in the papers attached to a memorandum of 17 August 1954 from the Chief of the Management Staff to the Acting DDA. 59/ This memorandum dealt with the nuts and bolts without which a new activity cannot operate -- personnel ceilings, T/O's, and budgets. Of particular note is a memorandum from General Cabell to all components of the Agency concerned. 60/ Its special interest is in the language of the first sentence, which reads

Until further notice, the CIA policy concerning the ELINT problem, is fully to support a progressive, piecemeal approach.

Government memoranda are full of sentences starting in the same way but almost invariably they call for a "progressive, fully integrated, comprehensive, well-thought-out, etc., etc., program." It is almost unique for a policy directive to call for a "piecemeal" approach. Cabell undoubtedly recognized the well-entrenched and valid service interests as

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

well as other departmental interests and was clear .. in his own mind that CIA should restrict itself to activities which would not duplicate those of other departments and were strictly within its mandate. His memorandum, after specifying what fields CIA would concentrate on (setting priorities, analysis and evaluation of the product, equipment research, etc.), went on to say

Other than for the general coordination of ELINT which has already been assumed by USCIB, the CIA does not wish to consider at this time the question of either the need for a greater degree of centralized overall control of ELINT, or the establishment of such. In this regard, CIA recognizes the intimacy of ELINT with various Service activities and the complexities of any attempt at centralized control. CIA personnel will adhere to this policy in all discussions dealing with the ELINT problem.

This last sentence showed that Cabell was worried that some of the Agency evangelists of ELINT might press for a centralized control of ELINT activities before the community was ready for it.

As the intelligence value of ELINT was recognized by other parts of the community, particularly the services, it became apparent that a national ELINT

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

policy was needed. One basis of this need was the very practical one of money and slots. The funds and personnel for ELINT had been diverted from other purposes, since neither people nor money had been formally allocated to this activity. The preliminary discussions in the community led to agreement that there should be a national center which should have a general responsibility for collection and technical processing. This would require dollars and bodies. An indication of this activity is found in a memorandum from the AD/SI to the DDCI in March 1955 in which the former asked for approval for his going ahead with recruiting for OSI manpower to assist in manning the national ELINT Center which was proposed as well as to provide manpower and space to support a USCIB ELINT committee and secretariat. Cabell approved this proposal on 29 March 1955, and Dulles initialed his approval. The USCIB had already set up an ELINT Committee by CIBD 17 (3 March 1955), and NSCID 17 was approved on 16 May 1955.

NSCID 17 assigned to the USCIB, which had been set up by NSCID 9 on 29 December 1952, the responsibility

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

for being the

national policy body for ELINT, including policy in relation to the Technical Processing Center. . . arrangements with foreign governments in the field of ELINT, and recommendations concerning research and development requirements.

It went on to provide that

The technical processing of all ELINT shall be accomplished in a center to be organized and administered by the Department of Defense. However, parallel processing in the field may be accomplished for essential immediate operational or tactical purposes. This center shall be jointly staffed by individuals detailed from the Department of Defense and the CIA in a proportion to be determined by the Secretary of Defense and the DCI.

It specified that all data collected should be made available forthwith to the Technical Processing Center, subject to delays resulting from field exploitation for urgent tactical or operational purposes, and that the results of the Center's processing should be made available to interested departments and agencies.

This directive appears simple, but there were catches in it. Paragraph 3 provided that subject to USCIB's policy guidance,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

the Department of Defense and the Central Intelligence Agency shall be responsible for their respective ELINT collection activities.

This allowed everyone to engage in collection.

Further, the provision allowing field processing for urgent reasons was an invitation to the multiplication of processing facilities, particularly since CIA and the services could justify the urgency of their own operational needs. Nevertheless, the NSCID gave a basis for the allocation of funds and manpower to ELINT activities and the technical center could theoretically have led to a cooperative effort.

It apparently did not. The Department of Defense designated the Air Force as its executive agent for ELINT. The Air Force proposed to set up the technical center in Dayton, Ohio, attached to the large Air Force Technical Intelligence Center there. There had been in operation for a number of years an informal center in Washington where some coordination of processing and read-out had been carried on by CIA, Army, and Navy (the Air Force taking no part). 61/ If the processing center specified in NSCID 17 were set up in Dayton, it

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

would suit the Air Force but would, as a practical matter, dissipate the trained assets and the experience of the other agencies engaged in ELINT. Dulles wrote to the Secretary of the Air Force in November 1955, protesting the proposal to set up the processing center in Dayton. 62/ The proposal was dropped and the center was set up at the Naval Security Station premises on Nebraska Avenue in Washington, D.C. This had been the location of the informal cooperative center which preceded NSCID 17. 63/ As provided in that directive, CIA supplied personnel to help man the center.

This arrangement did not, however, function in a very satisfactory manner. The Air Force was dominated by SAC, which was principally interested in radar order of battle. CIA officers believed that the Air Force did not give sufficient emphasis to the acquisition of technical intelligence, which was of major concern to CIA, and the exploration of many other fields in which ELINT could be a useful source. 64/

In 1957, at Presidential direction, the Science

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization set up a panel under the chairmanship of William O. Baker, the head of the Bell Laboratories. The purpose of this panel was to explore and make recommendations regarding a number of problems in the field of electronic intelligence. While the principal concerns of the Baker Panel dealt with COMINT matters, Recommendation 4 of this report of 23 January 1958 urged that

the responsibility for control of ELINT processing and analysis be assigned to the National Security Agency.

The Baker Panel report was referred to the Special Committee of the NSC which dealt with COMINT matters, 65/ which in turn made recommendations to the President which the latter approved. With regard to Recommendation 4 relative to ELINT, the Special Committee suggested that action be deferred

pending completion of a study by the USCIB in consultation with appropriate members of the Science Advisory Committee, reporting to the President through the Special Committee of the NSC for COMINT within six months.

The USCIB set up an ELINT Task Force with Philip Strong, DAD/SI of CIA, as chairman, which

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

reported on 9 June 1958. 66/ It was obvious that there were enough differing opinions as to how ELINT should be handled, enough vested interests and jurisdictional disagreements, to warrant an attempt to work out a mutually agreed setup. This is what the Task Force tried to do.

The Task Force explored various possible arrangements and concluded (with the Air Force representative dissenting) that the Secretary of Defense should be made executive agent of the Government for ELINT and that to the Director of NSA should be assigned

the authority and responsibility for providing an effective unified organization to control and direct the ELINT intercept, processing, and reporting activities of the US Government.

The advantages which the Task Force found for this course of action were that it would make possible the retention of the integrity of those ELINT functions not directly related to COMINT and would allow the delegation of unique functions to units needing them for operational reasons such as SAC. Centralization in NSA would also allow the integration of ELINT and COMINT when such integration was desirable and would centralize final signal analysis, thus

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

facilitating the definition of COMINT and ELINT emanations and making optimum use of the combined analytic skills and experience of both ELINT and COMINT experts. The Task Force saw NSA as providing integrated operational policies and technical doctrine and procedures and as coordinating relevant research and development.

This Task Force report was made at the time when all the NSCID's were being revised under the leadership of the DD/C, Truscott, and when, pursuant to the Presidential decision in NSC Action 1873 (13 March 1958), the IAC and the USCIB were being merged into a single Board, the USIB. As a result, old NSCID's 9 and 17 were revised and merged, and a new directive, NSCID 6, was finally promulgated 15 September 1958. The most important change, for the purposes discussed here, was in the role of USIB in relation to ELINT. While the USCIB had been the "National Policy body for ELINT..." and the DCI the nonvoting chairman, the new USIB was only advisory to the DCI. Although NSCID 6 on its face seemed to give USIB certain policymaking

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

functions in relation to COMINT and ELINT, the basic charter of the USIB was in NSCID 1, and the powers of the DCI were delineated there.\*

The new directive followed the old in that it designated the Secretary of Defense as the executive agent for both COMINT and ELINT and gave him the responsibility for conducting

those ELINT collection and processing activities which the Secretary of Defense determines are essential to provide direct support to commanders who plan and conduct military operations.

Such activities would be delegated "to those commanders, or to the cryptologic agencies which support them." As to NSA, NSCID 6 provided that

To the extent he deems feasible and in consonance with the aims of maximum overall efficiency, economy, and effectiveness [the Director of NSA should] centralize or consolidate the performance of COMINT and ELINT functions for which he is responsible.

As if this dual delegation of functions by the NSC did not provide enough space for jurisdictional

---

\* The matter of the merger of IAC and USCIB to form USIB is treated in Chapter 3, below.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

battles between the services and NSA, NSCID 6 went on to say

It is recognized that the Armed Forces and other departments and agencies being served require direct COMINT and ELINT support of various kinds. In providing this support, operational control of specified COMINT and ELINT facilities and resources will at times be delegated by the Director, for such periods and for such tasks as are determined by him, to an appropriate agent.

The mandate to the Director of NSA was far from that recommended by the Baker Panel.

NSCID 6 purported to provide a framework within which the COMINT and ELINT activities of the Government could be carried out in an integrated manner. But it is an excellent example of the fact that a system which looks satisfactory on paper will not work out in practice if the parties concerned do not find that it meets their genuine needs. In the field of COMINT, the community had as a practical matter worked out most of its troubles with the role assigned to NSA, even though there were complaints that NSA devoted its assets too much to targets which were the most readily susceptible to observation, such as order of battle and warning

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

indicators, at the expense of more difficult targets. NSA was apparently much less interested in ELINT, and its customers in CIA believed it slighted this field in the allocation of assets and personnel. For example, CIA believed that NSA paid too little attention to the analysis of Soviet missile telemetry. 67/ Furthermore, in the ELINT field, NSA had neither the expertise nor the continuity of experienced personnel which were needed.

General Cabell felt strongly that an effort to press for a highly centralized direction of ELINT by NSA would result, in practice, in a serious setback to the ELINT effort. This would not be because of any ill will on the part of NSA but rather because NSA was a well-established bureaucracy which had developed COMINT, its first responsibility, to a state of great usefulness. Its staff had long been focused on COMINT and recognized its importance and the grave problems in the path of its continued advance. Hence, little interest or expertise would be made available to the new step-child, ELINT. The people in the other departments and agencies

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

interested in ELINT were relatively junior and . . . would not be able to make their weight felt in the many conflicts which were certain to arise. They would need to gain more experience and more confidence. Hence they should be allowed to have their heads for a time; otherwise, ELINT would be set back for a long period. Furthermore, the cost of an active centralized ELINT effort would be great and it was unrealistic to expect that funds would be given to NSA which were wholly in addition to the funds provided for COMINT. Thus ELINT would to some extent have to compete, in the allocation of NSA resources, with well-established COMINT. ELINT would thus be considered to be encroaching at a time when it was too new and weak to compete. 68/

The services were not happy with the powers which had nominally been delegated to NSA. It was not until six months after NSCID 6 was issued that the Department of Defense directives pertaining to NSA's ELINT responsibilities were issued. 69/ Under the Department of Defense system, the NSCID was ineffective operationally in that Department until departmental directives providing for the methods of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

carrying it out were issued.

In this situation, full advantage was taken of the loopholes in the directive, most of which consisted of scars left by the opposition of particular members of the community to the initial delegation of broad responsibilities to NSA. CIA and the services, under NSCID 6, engaged in collection and parallel processing of ELINT, particularly in the case of telemetry, as Soviet missile activity became a priority target of intelligence. Coordination of activities was, however, by no means absent. It developed as collection techniques became more sophisticated with the advent of the U-2 and satellite reconnaissance. In many cases, the coordination was a by-product of cooperation in the management of collection devices. Thus ELINT was a field in which the coordination of activities was imperfect, to say the least, and where the legitimate operational requirements of the services and the failure of the principal coordinator, NSA, to perform to the satisfaction of its customers combined to negate the purposes of the organizational framework.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

It should not be assumed that bureaucratic pride and jealousy were the principal moving forces at work. The capabilities of SAC were the backbone of the US defenses against the USSR. Enemy radar order of battle was of vital concern to SAC, and it had built up a considerable capability in this field. Radar order of battle of a different sort was of major importance to the Navy at a time when the carrier was its most important weapons system. CIA was concerned, under direction of the NSC, with Soviet capabilities for jamming radio signals. These are only a few of the legitimate concerns of the various members of the community. Each had developed collection techniques suited to its needs, and also analysis for its particular purposes. An attempt to impose a tidy "coordinated" structure would have been doomed. The cooperation which developed, informally in most cases, between various operators probably was more effective than any theoretically defensible overall coordinating system.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## Chapter 2

Coordination of Clandestine CollectionCoordination of Activities

If the production of coordinated intelligence involved problems, they were generally less intractable than those raised by efforts to coordinate intelligence activities. While there was no statutory or NSCID definition of the coordination of intelligence activities, it was generally understood that the objective was to avoid duplication and overlapping. This was to be accomplished by having each member of the community carry those responsibilities for which it was best qualified, while the others refrained from competing activities.

This objective seems clear enough in theory but proved very difficult in practice. NSCID 1, the directive outlining the general framework of the duties and responsibilities of the members of the intelligence community, in its version of 28 March 1952, did not

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

specifically refer to this objective except where it, provided, in paragraph 4, that

Insofar as practicable, he [the DCI] shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of the various departments and agencies but shall make use of existing intelligence facilities and shall utilize departmental intelligence for such production purposes.

This referred to the responsibility to produce intelligence relating to the national security, hereafter referred to as national intelligence.

This language reflected the controversies regarding the role and functions of CIA which occurred in the early days, when the established intelligence components of the various governmental departments were jealously guarding their prerogatives against encroachment by the new CIA. It was meant to restrict the DCI, emphasizing his dependence on departmental collection and research.

As the role of CIA developed and the need for more professional research and analysis was recognized, this restrictive language was replaced.

When the NSCID's were generally revised in the spring of 1958, paragraph 8 of the 2 April 1958 version

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

of NSCID 1 provided that

Insofar as practicable, in the fulfillment of their respective responsibilities for the production of intelligence, the several departments and agencies shall not duplicate the intelligence activities and research of other departments, and agencies and shall make full use of existing capabilities of the other members of the intelligence community.

This language is, of course, a general statement of an objective and gives the DCI no powers. This same language is found in paragraph 6.b. of the 15 September 1958 version of NSCID 1. (The 15 September 1958 revision was made primarily to reflect the creation of the USIB.)

The various versions of NSCID 1 had another set of clauses which were relevant to the role of the DCI in the coordination of activities. The version of 28 March 1952 provided in paragraph 2 that

To the extent authorized by Section 102 (e) of the National Security Act of 1947, the Director of Central Intelligence, or representatives designated by him, by arrangement with the head of the department or agency concerned, shall make such surveys and inspections of departmental intelligence material of the various Federal departments and agencies relating to the national security as he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise the NSC and to make recommendations for the coordination of intelligence activities.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

This tortuous language, aside from reflecting the bureaucratic conflicts which attended the enactment of the National Security Act, is unusual in a specific way. Section 102 (e) of the Act gave the DCI power to inspect departmental intelligence

To the extent recommended by the National Security Council and approved by the President.

The NSC, in NSCID 1, referred to powers given by the Act although the Act gave the NSC the duty of defining the powers. The dog had caught his tail and no one had defined the DCI's powers. Until the revision of the NSCID's in 1958, the DCI (or the Agency, for the National Security Act is cavalier in its interchangeable use of the two) was faced with the statutory responsibility of

coordinating the intelligence activities of the several government departments and agencies in the interest of the national security,

was directed to advise, and

to make recommendations to the National Security Council for the coordination of ... intelligence activities

relating to the national security and was given some power of inspection which neither the Congress in

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

passing the Act nor the NSC in approving NSCID 1 was willing to spell out.

The 21 April 1958 revision of NSCID 1 made some attempt to clarify the situation. In paragraph 19 it provided:

To the extent authorized by paragraph (e) and for the purposes recited in paragraphs (d) (1) and (2) of Section 102 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the Director of Central Intelligence, or representatives designated by him, in consultation with the head of the intelligence or other appropriate component of the department or agency concerned, shall make such surveys of departmental intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies as he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise the National Security Council and to coordinate the intelligence effort of the United States.

This language did not completely clear up the DCI's authority, although it could be interpreted to give him *carte blanche* to investigate the other intelligence components to the extent he considered necessary and could get the head of the relevant intelligence component to agree. It might be pointed out that whereas the 1952 version referred to "surveys and inspections of departmental intelligence *material*," this 1958 version referred to "departmental intelligence

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

*activities.*" (Emphasis added.) This was a rather ..  
startling enlargement of a mandate.

NSCID 1 was again amended on 18 January 1961,  
and paragraph 3.c. left out references to the National  
Security Act and the NSC when it provided that

The Director of Central Intelligence, or  
representatives designated by him, in  
consultation with the head of the intelli-  
gence or other appropriate component of  
the department or agency concerned, shall  
make such surveys of departmental intelli-  
gence activities of the various departments  
and agencies as he may deem necessary in con-  
nection with his duty to advise the National  
Security Council and to coordinate the  
intelligence effort of the United States.

The statement of the objective of avoiding duplication,  
contained in paragraph 8 of the 1958 versions. is  
repeated in paragraph 6.b. of the 18 January 1961  
version, but again without giving specific powers to  
the DCI.

An analysis of these various documents is  
important primarily because it indicates a slow increase  
in the authority given officially to the DCI, or at  
the very least a slow diminution of limitations placed  
upon him. Starting with the bare statutory responsibility  
to "coordinate" the US intelligence effort, the directive

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NSCID 1 moves from an injunction in the 1952 version against the DCI's duplicating the intelligence activities and research of other departments to a generalized statement in the subsequent versions that all departments and agencies shall, "Insofar as practicable, in the fulfillment of their respective responsibilities for the production of intelligence," avoid duplicating the activities and research of others. The DCI is told to make recommendations to the NSC, but always with the participation of the IAC, whose concurrence or dissent must be stated. An undefined authority in the 1952 version to make surveys and inspections of "departmental intelligence material" of departments and agencies, "by arrangement with the *head of the department concerned*" (emphasis supplied) becomes a general authority to make,

in consultation with the *head of the intelligence or other appropriate component of the department or agency concerned,...* as he may deem necessary in connection with his duty to advise the National Security Council and to coordinate the intelligence effort of the United States. (emphasis supplied)

The only reference to the coordination of activities in the 1952 version is a revealing clause

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

to protect the established agencies, i.e.,

3. Coordination of intelligence activities should be designed primarily to strengthen the over-all governmental intelligence structure. Primary departmental requirements shall be recognized and shall receive the cooperation and support of the Central Intelligence Agency.

This clause disappears from later versions.

These changes in NSCID 1 reflect the changes that occurred in the real world of the intelligence community. The fear that the new CIA would take over the jobs and positions of the established intelligence components gave way to a greater degree of acceptance of the Agency. Partly this was due to the caution and tact with which Dullès, as Smith before him, sought to develop the role of CIA and to convince the other agencies that CIA was not set on doing them in. Partly it was due to the fact that, with the fairly rapid rotation characteristic of the service intelligence components, officers who resented the creation of CIA were displaced by officers who accepted the existence of CIA as a fact of life. Partly it was due to recognition of CIA's ability to perform tasks of use to the whole community, recognition

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

that had to be earned and could not be created on order. Thus the Act and the various versions of the basic NSC directive governing the NSCID 1, gave Dulles the responsibility to coordinate the activities of the community so as to avoid duplication of effort. But this did not give him the power to do so, nor was it in accord with his theory of operations or his character to seek such power. As explained previously, he believed that ends achieved by negotiation, willing cooperation, and persuasion would be more lasting than those achieved by the exercise of authority. Furthermore, it is not surprising that the directives did not give him power to prevent duplication of effort or to order that particular activities be carried on only by one specified member of the community, for example to compel the termination of activities which were inconsistent with his views of a "coordinated" intelligence effort. That is not how a government works. To use the jargon of the military, one could not give the DCI command authority over the Secretaries of State and Defense. An attempt to do so, aside from violating what everyone would recognize as

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

one of the basic laws of organization, would have been ineffective. As a practical matter, real control over activities can only be exercised by him who has control over the budget and the allocation of funds and personnel slots. Furthermore, it is hard to overestimate the power of a bureaucracy to delay, if not actually frustrate, the carrying out of a directive which it opposes.

In any event, the formal language of the Act and the directives were not in fact the last word. It was clear that an integration of the separate components of the community to the extent necessary to produce national intelligence was a purpose of the Act and the responsibility of the DCI. But in this case, as is always the case in a bureaucracy where semiautonomous departments are involved, the process of achieving full cooperation and common approaches depends on other forces. The attitude of the President was of primary importance because the NSC, in spite of all the powers which statutes or regulations may purport to delegate to it, was merely advisory to the President, and its members served at his pleasure. It is obvious, however, that no President

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

can personally monitor the operation of so large and amorphous a body as the intelligence community. Nor can the NSC -- two of whose principal members (the Secretaries of State and Defense) had under their jurisdiction most of the non-CIA intelligence community. It was partly to meet this need (and partly to head off the creation of a standing Congressional "watch dog" committee) that President Eisenhower created, early in 1956, a President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PBCFIA). 70/ It might be pointed out that the creation of this board had been recommended to the President by Dulles in a letter 71/ which cited the recommendation of the Clark Task Force of the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch. The board was created by Executive Order 10656, 13 January 1956.

The board took perhaps too theoretical a view of how the community could be managed so as to achieve integration and avoid duplication. It was, in any event, obviously disappointed with the nonauthoritarian way in which Dulles went about carrying out his responsibilities for the coordination of activities. Over

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

the course of its whole existence, it made a number of attempts to prod Dulles into taking a more active role. The Board made a first series of recommendations to the President in its report of 20 December 1956. Those relevant to the subject here under discussion are numbers 1 and 4, as follows 72/:

1. That the DCI be encouraged to exercise a more comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility in directing the integration, reduction of duplication, and coordination of the national intelligence effort.
4. That action be taken to effect strong, centralized direction (both through the National Security Council and the Director of Central Intelligence) of the Intelligence Community and its resources, in order to strengthen our national intelligence effort and to contain its costs.

The President approved these recommendations and directed that they be sent to the DCI with instructions to report progress in six months.

Dulles's response was to circulate a memorandum to the IAC members as well as to the President in which he proposed the NSCID 1 be revised to clarify it and to place on all departments a prohibition against duplication of activities and research. He also proposed to appoint in CIA a Deputy Director for

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Coordination, though no name was suggested.

On 8 July 1957, Dulles drafted a proposed letter to the President and a suggested memorandum for the President to sign. 73/ (The covering memorandum was sent through Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, "In view of the fact that the recommendations of the Killian Board were handled through you.") Dulles said he would like to discuss the matter with the President. The proposed letter to the President referred to the recommendations of the PBCFIA "that the Director of Central Intelligence exercise a more comprehensive and positive coordination responsibility." It went on to quote the PBCFIA:

The Board also expressed the view that strong centralized direction under which the resources of the various elements of the intelligence community would be brought closer together would do much to strengthen the national intelligence effort and to reduce its costs.

In the letter to the President, Dulles also said that, after consultation with the President, he had designated General Lucian K. Truscott, Jr. as his Deputy Director for Coordination.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The proposed memorandum for the President's signature stated his concurrence in the PBCFIA's view that a

strong centralized direction of the intelligence effort of the United States through the National Security Council and the Director of Central Intelligence was needed.

It went on to say that

The exercise of a more comprehensive and positive coordinating responsibility by the Director of Central Intelligence can be of the utmost value to the entire intelligence community and strengthen the national intelligence effort.

It concluded

All members of the intelligence community will render the Director of Central Intelligence the fullest possible cooperation in the accomplishment of this objective.

The President signed the proposed memorandum which was circulated under date of 5 August 1957 to the statutory members of the NSC, the DCI, and to the Secretary of the Treasury, George Humphrey (a trusted advisor of President Eisenhower who normally sat with the NSC), the Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Chairman of the JCS. 74/

Thus the President by his memorandum supported a

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

strong position for the DCI in the field of coordination. While the memorandum did not spell out what was meant by "coordination," the PBCFIA recommendations did when they referred to "integration and reduction of duplication."

The PBCFIA was not happy with this response to their recommendations. They believed that Dulles should have taken more drastic steps.\* The board was critical when in 1958 the NSCID's were revised in accordance with their recommendations. A memorandum from Truscott to Dulles dated 11 March 1958 reads in part

The Board [PBCFIA] believes, however, that the NSCID's over-emphasize repetitiously the provision that the DCI generally carries out his coordinating responsibilities "in cooperation with" the members of the IAC, thus diluting the DCI's responsibility and minimizing his authority. 75/

As has been pointed out, the statute gave the DCI only the power to make recommendations to the NSC

---

\* More detailed discussion of this matter will be found in Volume IV, Chapter 4, which deals with the board's pressure on Dulles to appoint an Executive Director.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

(Sec. 102 (d) (2)), and the NSCID required that he state the concurrence or dissent of the USIB members. Further, it was the view of Dulles that persuasion was a method far preferable to direction. In commenting on a recommendation of the PBCFIA in 1960, he wrote in part

Further, I think it is clear from the law that my authority for coordination is a recommending one and not a mandate. I recognize that thus far in our efforts we have tried to achieve coordination more through persuasion than through coercion or recourse to the NSC, and I recognize, as suggested by the Joint Study Group report, that more frequent recourse to the NSC on my part might have been desirable. I would point out, however, that the intelligence community is a closely knit family and is responsive to most requirements for better coordination, though I admit that sometimes the process of achieving it is long and laborious. Once achieved by persuasion rather than by fiat, the coordination is likely to develop more effectively than under orders which might be subject to evasion or delay in execution. 76/

Generalized directives from the President or the NSC and recommendations from an advisory Board were one thing. The actual working out of the practical problems of the coordination of activities was another.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Agreed Activities

If one were to ask any CIA officer who had been concerned with clandestine operations abroad, particularly in Germany or Japan during the late 1940's and the 1950's, what had been the principal problem of coordination, his immediate response would be "agreed activities." This phrase became the term applied to the clandestine intelligence and counter-intelligence operations of the services, and a more inappropriate name would be hard to imagine. The nature of the problem was that the activities themselves were not agreed upon, and the participants did not agree as to what should be done.

A bit of background is necessary. At the end of World War II, US military forces in Europe and the Far East had, of course, their own intelligence organizations which had engaged actively in the collection and processing of intelligence on the enemy as well as counterintelligence operations for their own protection. The degree of hostility of the environment after the end of the war, and the dangers to US forces, were unknowns. As a con-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

sequence, the field intelligence forces kept on doing what they had done, if at a reduced level."

It was not long before the hostility, subversive activities, and political ambitions of the Communist powers became apparent. US commanders -- with their forces scattered over large parts of West Germany, in Berlin, and in long lines of communication back to the Atlantic and across the Atlantic to the United States -- felt a strong need for good intelligence and counterintelligence to protect their men. The debacle of the nationalist forces in China and the assumption of power by the Communists created a comparable situation in the Far East.

In Europe the threats to US communications, such as the Berlin Blockade of 1948, emphasized the vulnerability of US forces. The possibility of early general war with the USSR was a major factor in US policy considerations.\* The Korean War,

---

\* In January 1952, a National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 48, was approved entitled "Probability of General War in 1952" -- an estimate covering the next 11 months.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

starting in 1950, and the Chinese Communist intervention, were followed in the middle 1950's by the Taiwan Strait crisis. These events kept the threat of Communist China to the US position in the Far East in the forefront of military planning.

NSCID 5. It is against this background that the "agreed activities" controversy must be viewed. This name came out of NSCID 5, which dealt with responsibilities for the conduct of clandestine intelligence and counterintelligence operations abroad. The first version, issued on 12 December 1947, provided that the DCI should conduct all organized Federal espionage operations abroad to meet the needs of all departments and agencies, "except for certain agreed activities by other Departments and Agencies." 77/ With regard to counterespionage, it granted similar authority to the DCI except that his responsibility should not be construed "to preclude the counterintelligence activities of any army, navy, or air command or installation and certain agreed activities by Departments and Agencies necessary for the security of such organizations."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

It went on to say that the DCI should be "responsible for coordinating covert and overt intelligence collection activities."

In the background of the NSCID was the controversy which raged while the National Security Act of 1947 was in the drafting stage and under consideration in Congress. The services were strongly opposed to being dependent on an outside civilian agency for the clandestine collection of intelligence relevant to their missions and their safety. 78/ They lost the battle for total independence but it was acknowledged that there were legitimate intelligence and counterintelligence functions which they could and should carry out. Furthermore, it was recognized that there was a continuing need to train military officers in the craft of secret intelligence and, to the extent possible, give them practical experience so that the expertise would exist in time of war and, as has been said, the possibility of war in the immediate future was in the minds of many.

It was to meet these legitimate needs that the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

services were to engage in "agreed activities," and.. presumably it was thought that an agreement with the DCI would be reached which would outline the respective roles.\* A number of initiatives were taken, some by the military, some by CIA, to agree on a paper delineating responsibilities and procedures. 79/

From 1951 to the middle of 1954, various drafts were passed back and forth, but no agreements were reached. As a bureaucratic matter, this meant that no DCID's to spell out the detailed application of NSCID 5 were issued. NSCID 5 was amended on 28 August 1951

---

\* Lawrence R. Houston, the General Counsel, was present at the meeting of the IAC which was considering NSCID 5. He recalls the origin of the phrase "agreed activities":

At that time...the draft gave CIA the exclusive role in espionage and counterespionage. At first there was no objection, but more or less as an afterthought one of the members, I believe it was General Chamberlain, mentioned that the military had responsibility for protection of its facilities and bases and that it sometimes had to engage in clandestine intelligence and counterintelligence to carry out this responsibility. Admiral Inglis also mentioned that the Navy had a program for using reserve officers for collection of intelligence of interest to the Navy, primarily by briefing them before taking trips abroad and debriefing them afterwards. Admiral Hillenkoetter said that he thought this was all perfectly reasonable, and he saw no problem in agreeing to such activities as they arose. Accordingly the "agreed activities" phrase was added to the draft of NSCID 5.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

by adding provisions that the DCI would keep the senior US representative (usually the Ambassador) "appropriately" advised of espionage and counterespionage operations in or from the relevant area and that in occupied areas, he would also keep the senior US Military Commander generally advised. 80/ This change did not have much relevance to the coordination problem here being discussed.

During all this period there was no formal agreement as to who should carry on what activities, nor any established procedure for coordination in the field. The situation was almost certainly at its most confused in Germany, particularly Berlin. In 1953, Gordon Stewart, who had been Deputy to General Truscott, the Senior CIA Representative in Germany, was able to write that

over the past eight years, CIA and the services have maintained espionage operations in Berlin without any real operational agreement or operational coordination. 81/

In Germany, the problem involved the Army for the most part. The Navy had only a relatively small clandestine intelligence operation; many of the tar-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

gets of interest to the Navy were not particularly accessible from Germany. The Air Force was likewise more interested in intelligence targets which were in the USSR and related to its strategic and tactical missions, for example SAC and USAFE targets and antiaircraft and radar capabilities.\* Both services had a legitimate interest in counterintelligence to protect their installations in Germany and conducted operations in support of this interest. Gordon Stewart wrote in 1953

I believe it is commonly accepted in Washington that the Navy and Air Force are perfectly willing to accept CIA as it was conceived -- as a support to their intelligence work -- and that the Army has at best been reluctant, and at worst has positively rejected CIA as a support to the G-2. 82/

The Army was, of course, faced by a situation different from that of the Navy and Air Force. Its ground troops were confronted by a superior number

---

\* General Cabell told the author in September 1970 that when he became the Director of Intelligence for the Air Force in May 1948, a few months after the birth of the Air Force, he made a policy decision that, during his administration, the Air Force would not engage in clandestine collection of positive intelligence: this would be left to CIA. He further noted that the Air Force Office of Special Investigations was chartered by the Air Force to conduct those counterintelligence activities, overt and clandestine, needed to protect its forces.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

of fully equipped and trained Soviet divisions across the zonal boundaries and surrounding the Berlin garrison. These Soviet troops were supplied and supported largely by supply lines across Poland and East Germany. To the Soviet forces should be added a strong East German army. Matters such as order of battle and the state of readiness and supply were of immense importance to the US Army.

The Army therefore maintained a large clandestine intelligence outfit, numbering in the thousands. It recruited agents, questioned defectors and escapees as well as travelers, and in general exploited all the means it could think of to gather information. It is the testimony of CIA officers who served in Germany that many of these operations were conducted in an unprofessional manner. The experience of many of the Army officers assigned to intelligence had been in combat, where numbers could often be the deciding factor; there was thus a tendency to rely on numbers of agents rather than on quality. Furthermore, the senior intelligence officers were subject to regular rotation and thus did not have time to acquire professional

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

intelligence skills. Many of the "agents" the Army used were fabricators, "paper mills," or otherwise misleading. Agents were recruited and sent behind the Soviet lines with inadequate preparation and control, with the result that an unconscionable number were detected and liquidated. Agents who were already working for some other intelligence service were recruited, paid again, and lost. It is probably true that all US and other intelligence officers in Germany did the same sort of thing, but there is little doubt that the Army operations were particularly amateurish.

US intelligence as a whole got a very bad name among the refugees and other sources of agents. It was not that no useful intelligence was obtained; much was. But the mass effort was so unprofessional that its bad effects probably outweighed its achievements. To make matters worse, the services, particularly the Army, in Germany tried to conduct operations through third countries, e.g. Sweden and Switzerland,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

[REDACTED] They were not well carried out.

Then there were problems between the Army and the Gehlen Organization, the German intelligence service. This organization had been put together by the US military after the war and had remained under their tutelage until the late 1940's, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

When it ceased to be the charge of the US Army, the latter turned a more critical eye on it. Allegations were made that it harbored former Nazis, that it was not responsive to the collection requirements of the military [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The situation in the Far East was apparently much less acute. It should be remembered that from the end of World War II until well into the Korean War, the Far East Commander was General Douglas MacArthur, who was opposed to a CIA presence in his theater, as he had been to an OSS presence during World War II.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

This opposition was probably greatly influenced by his Chief of Intelligence, Major General Charles A. Willoughby. 83/ As a result, CIA had very limited capabilities and little chance to build them up until well after MacArthur was relieved in 1951. Consequently a situation of competition between the Army and CIA did not build up. Furthermore, at all times it was so difficult to obtain intelligence on North Korea and China, two important targets, that the Army was willing to accept such help as CIA could give it. In the whole Pacific theater, the Navy and to a lesser extent the Air Force were active in the clandestine intelligence field, but the problems of coordinating clandestine intelligence seem to have been much less acute.

DCID 5/1. Reference has been made to the sporadic efforts to define the nature of and procedures for coordination in the field. Finally, on 11 January 1955, as a result of protracted negotiations between CIA (led by Cabell) and the Army G-2, DCID 5/1 was issued. Nominally, the procedures for conducting "agreed activities" had been given a definitive in-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

terpretation. The new DCID provided that

Review and coordination of *plans* for the clandestine collection activities of the Armed Services and *plans* of the Central Intelligence Agency for the clandestine collection of information of interest to the Armed Services will be accomplished with each service to the extent practicable at the *national* level. [i.e. in Washington -- emphasis added] 84/

In the field, designated representatives of the military commanders and of the DCI were to review the activities and the operational plans and procedures of the commanders as well as CIA activities in direct support of the commanders. If the DCI's representative considered an activity, plan, or agent to be "potentially harmful to the over-all clandestine effort," no action would be taken (except in case of an emergency) pending referral of the matter to Washington to be decided between the DCI and the service chief. Thus, in theory, the designated field representative of the DCI was to have a modified veto over field activities of the services, at least to the extent of requiring that disagreements should be referred to Washington.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The Trudeau Affair. The approval of DCID 5/1 by the IAC had something of a calming effect, and procedures were worked out between CIA and the Army which made for some coordination. 85/ The problem, however, was far from solved, as indicated by events of the next months. The bare bones of subsequent events are that in June 1955, when German Chancellor Adenauer visited President Eisenhower, the Chancellor saw General Arthur G. Trudeau, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, of the Army.

This unusual meeting came about as follows: Trudeau had met the German ambassador earlier at a dinner and expressed the wish that there was some contact in the German Embassy for intelligence matters. When the Ambassador said that he himself was the intelligence chief of the Embassy, Trudeau gave voice to some derogatory comments about the Gehlen organization. This conversation was reported to Adenauer by the German Ambassador and Adenauer asked to see Trudeau. Such a meeting took place at the German Embassy and Trudeau repeated his criticisms of the Gehlen Organization. Trudeau had the charges typed on seven 3x5 cards which he showed to Adenauer, who promptly put

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

them in his pocket (an event which Trudeau probably had not foreseen). 86/ Adenauer, when he returned to Germany, gave the cards to his State Secretary, Hans Globke, who was in charge of relations with Gehlen\* for the Chancellor's Office. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

This exchange created a situation which Dulles could not tolerate. An important matter relating to US intelligence relations and operations in Germany had been taken up with the German Government by the Army G-2 without a word to the DCI, who [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] was charged by the President, through the NSCID, with the primary responsibility for all matters relating to clandestine

---

\* The Gehlen Organization had not yet been established officially as the formal German Intelligence Service.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

intelligence abroad. If one of the services could ignore the DCI's role in so blatant a manner, the latter's position in relation to the whole field of foreign clandestine intelligence would be fatally undermined. Despite Dulles's reluctance to precipitate issues with other members of the intelligence community, he could not let this situation go unchallenged. And he did not.

On 22 July 1955, he wrote a letter to Robert B. Anderson, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, recounting the whole matter in detail, repeating the charges Trudeau's cards had made and Critchfield's comments. 87/ As a result of this letter, the case was referred to General Maxwell Taylor, who had become Army Chief of Staff on 30 June. (There were other instances in which the Army G-2 had acted in a way to undercut the DCI and CIA which Dulles reported at least orally to Taylor. 88/) Trudeau was called before Taylor who charged that Trudeau's actions were not in the national interest. After the hearing, Trudeau was relieved as G-2 and sent to the Far East as Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans. Trudeau's

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

last appearance at the IAC as Army representative was on 19 July 1955, four days before Dulles's letter to Anderson. His replacement was General Ridgely Gaither, who attended the IAC meeting of 23 August.

The Adenauer-Trudeau visit was, of course, not publicly known, and the reassignment of Trudeau need not have raised any comment; Taylor had already replaced his G-1 and G-3, as well as other senior staff officers. But on 2 September 1955, the New York *Daily News* printed a story under the headline "Ike Fires G-2 Boss at Bid of Allen Dulles," over the by-line of John O'Donnell. The story, which had its germ of truth was shot through with wild errors, said that Dulles was incensed by Trudeau's talk with Adenauer and his attack on the Gehlen Organization; that Dulles had written Secretary of Defense Wilson demanding Trudeau's removal, which was resisted by the whole Pentagon; that Dulles had urged the President to order Trudeau's removal and had been backed up by his brother, John Foster Dulles, and that the President had reluctantly agreed. The implication of the piece was that Allen Dulles was making a grab

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

for power and that he might seek to control the FBI, Secret Service, etc. The *Daily News* story was picked up by the wire services, with added comments, including comments by Trudeau which cast doubt on many points in the story. On the same day, the Army officially denied that Trudeau had been dismissed as G-2 on orders from the President. Trudeau said the story was "full of distortions."

The matter was by no means dead. On 8 September, Cabell, the Acting DCI in Dulles's absence, sent a letter to Secretary of the Army Brucker, telling him that "a CIA official" had seen

what is reliably reported to be a memorandum from "the Army" which is claimed to be a copy of the memorandum furnished by "the Army" to John O'Donnel of THE NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, and made the basis for part of his copyrighted story in the NEWS of Friday, 2 September 1955.

The memorandum, after alleging that Dulles had made charges to the Secretary of Defense against Trudeau and had asked for his relief, went on to say that Dulles had been trying to get rid of Trudeau since March 1954, and that Dulles was trying to "invade the Pentagon" and had engaged in "questionable in-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

telligence activities" in Germany. 89/

A memorandum by the CIA General Counsel, Lawrence R. Houston, dated 12 September 1955, reports that on 26 August Houston had seen General William Donovan, who had reported that Trudeau had told Donovan a long story about making an inspection of the Gehlen Organization and then telling Chancellor Adenauer that that organization was "insecure and badly organized." 90/ According to Donovan, Trudeau said that thereafter he found that a memorandum was circulating in the Joint Chiefs of Staff which alleged that his meeting with Adenauer was not in the best interests of the US. Donovan said that Trudeau was careful to say that the paper he referred to was not an official CIA paper; Trudeau said he had always gotten fair treatment from Dulles. Donovan understood an inference, however, that the paper had been instigated by CIA at a lower level than the Director's Office.

As to how General Trudeau came to his conclusions regarding the lack of security within the Gehlen Organization, [REDACTED] and CIA's

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

poor performance in Germany, later and collateral testimony furnishes a possible explanation. 91/ There is good evidence, which reached high Agency officers through a round-about channel, to the effect that a Lieutenant Colonel Earl Lerette (commander of the Army intelligence detachment in Berlin) had undertaken an investigation of intelligence matters in Germany at the request of General Trudeau. 92/ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] it is a fair inference that Lerette's report was adverse to several aspects of intelligence activities in Germany and was probably the stimulus to Trudeau's demarche to Adenauer and furnished the bulk of its substantive comment.

It is difficult to understand, however, how Trudeau could have found it appropriate to complain of the Gehlen Organization to the German Ambassador and Chancellor without having brought his material to the attention of Dulles, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If, as Lerette had alleged, Trudeau had ordered an inves-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

tigation by the Army of CIA's operations and had knowledge that this investigation questioned the security of senior CIA officers, and again failed to take the matter to Dulles, his conduct is still more incomprehensible. His superiors in the Army, both General Taylor and the Army Secretary, obviously saw at once that such behavior was intolerable and that he could not stay as G-2, dealing as the Army representative with Dulles on IAC. Dulles's letter to Deputy Secretary Anderson had stated

my own confidence in General Trudeau's judgment and discretion and his willingness to cooperate with me has been gravely shaken.

It should be noted that Trudeau had been cooperative with CIA in Germany in other cases, and his personal intervention provided the Army support that made the Berlin Tunnel operation possible, and Donovan told Houston, as mentioned above, that Trudeau said he had always had fair treatment from Dulles.\*

\* 


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

After the Trudeau Affair. The Trudeau incident had the effect of clarifying and greatly strengthening the position of the DCI as far as Washington was concerned. It was, however, a painful one for Dulles. He recognized that his was the responsibility for the dismissal of Trudeau, and being placed in an adversary position with G-2 ran counter to his philosophy and temperamental preference for working things out amicably.\*

One might have thought that the Trudeau affair, which reinforced the DCI's position, would have resulted in changed relations in Germany. This happened to only a minor extent, however. In the middle of 1956, representatives of the President's Board went

---



\* In another situation about this time, Dulles made it clear to the writer how distasteful the Trudeau incident had been and how he would avoid anything like it if possible.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

to Germany. A member of the group reported on ..  
24 July 1956 that Army commanders, in the guise of  
protecting the security of their forces, engaged in  
widespread intelligence operations, many of which  
duplicated CIA activities. This duplication was  
particularly apparent in dealings with legal and  
illegal travelers to the Iron Curtain countries.  
There seemed to be little knowledge among the military  
of the purpose of NSCID 5, and the military direc-  
tives which purported to supplement the NSCID were  
"one-sided." 93/ The President's Board referred to  
this problem a number of times. In April 1958,  
General Cassidy, the Executive Secretary of the  
PBCFIA, reported to the Inspector General

that Admiral Connolly [a member of the  
Board] had reported to the Board at  
some length on the "agreed activities"  
situation in Berlin and elsewhere in  
Europe. The Admiral expressed very  
strong views to the effect that he  
thought the situation in Berlin was  
intolerable, and that rather than five  
agencies, each running their operation  
as they saw fit, only one agency - namely  
the CIA - should be running operations.  
Apparently both Dr. Killian, who had been  
in Berlin two years ago, and General Hull,  
who was there last year, tended to agree  
with Admiral Connolly's views. 94/

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

On the Washington front, with the Trudeau affair, it was apparent that neither NSCID 5 nor DCID 5/1<sup>1</sup> was yet really effective and that efforts to straighten out the respective responsibilities and the relationships in the field pertaining to clandestine operations could not be relaxed. W. Lloyd George, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] recalls receiving a communication from Dulles in which he made it plain he was fed up with the attacks on this score from the services. The specific form of attack which bothered him was their practice of telling members of Congress that CIA was not filling the requirements of the services, with the result that Congressmen taxed Dulles with this failure in appearances before Congressional committees.\* This, of course, was an old trick, levying impossible requirements that looked plausible on their face, and then complaining when they were not satisfied.

During the next year, mid-1955 to late 1956, various efforts were made to bring about an under-

---

\* No trace of this communication has been found by George.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

standing as to the conduct of clandestine operations abroad. It became clear that CIA and the services could not agree on detailed directives implementing DCID 5/1, and much time was spent on elaborating CIA instructions to the field in the hope that arrangements which were difficult to formulate in Washington could be worked out in the field and so that CIA's own house would be in order when further confrontation occurred. It is undoubtedly true that in some places, relations between CIA and the services were harmonious, cooperation was good, and even in some areas clandestine operations were coordinated. Much depended, as it always did, on the personal relations of the people involved and the degree of suspicion of CIA that prevailed. It was widely felt in the early postwar days that if CIA learned about an operation conducted by a service that seemed promising, CIA would try to take it over. Those who have had long experience in the field admit that there were grounds for this fear. As in so many of CIA's relations with other members of the intelligence community, things started to get sorted out

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

as CIA gained in competence and professionalism, as earlier free-wheeling activities were replaced by better planned and better handled operations. This was, however, a slow process, and the fact that most intelligence officers in the services stayed only a relatively short time in their posts due to the practice of rotation, made it necessary for a large number of officers to go through the educational process.

In December 1956, the President's Board (PBCFIA) recommended that all the NSCID's be reviewed and revised to bring them up to date. 95/ Early in 1957, a series of task forces was set up to draft these revisions. These came under the jurisdiction of Truscott when he became DDC later in 1957. NSCID 5 was, of course, one of the directives to be rewritten.

No sooner had this exercise started than the services tried to stake out a field of unsupervised activity in the clandestine collection field. At an early meeting on the revision of NSCID 5, the Navy representative presented a draft which would have cut the CIA position to shreds. Truscott refused to

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

consider this draft, stating that it was wholly at variance with the wishes of the President, whose firm conviction it was that more positive coordination by the DCI was essential to an effective intelligence effort. It was strange that the Navy would have presented this draft, as the issues and competition between CIA and the Navy had been minimal. Probably the Navy was the chosen instrument of all the services. At any rate, a draft of a new NSCID 5 was prepared in CIA, with the participation of Truscott's staff and negotiated for almost a year with the services. 96/ Finally in April 1958, a revised directive was approved, first in the IAC, then in the NSC.

NSCID 5 of 21 April 1958 was a wholly new document. 97/ It defined espionage and counterintelligence. It used strong language to emphasize the DCI's paramount position. For example, Paragraph 2 states the basic purpose of the directive in the following terms:

To ensure centralized direction through prior, comprehensive and continuing coordination of all clandestine activities

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

authorized herein, the Director of Central Intelligence shall...

It goes on to direct the DCI to establish, in consultation with IAC, necessary procedures to coordinate all clandestine activities outside the United States, including liaison which involves clandestine activities of foreign clandestine services, etc. Paragraph 3 is stark in its assignment of responsibility: "The Central Intelligence Agency has primary responsibility for clandestine activities abroad." As for other departments, Paragraph 4 provides that "Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 above" (the paragraph giving the DCI the task of coordinating all foreign clandestine operations) they may conduct supplementary espionage in order to satisfy departmental intelligence needs, conduct clandestine counterintelligence activities necessary for the security of their forces, and conduct liaison with foreign clandestine services concerning the foregoing. There were further provisions regarding the keeping of senior US representatives and military commanders "appropriately" advised of clandestine operations. Special provisions were made for time of war. This

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

directive, with only minor nonsubstantive changes, .. remained in force throughout Dulles's administration.

It is hard to imagine a more forthright assertion of the primacy of the Director and CIA in the clandestine foreign intelligence field. Gone were the vague words of "agreed activities," which were never agreed. The services were restricted to permission to "Conduct supplementary espionage in order to satisfy departmental intelligence needs" and "clandestine counterintelligence activities necessary for the security of their personnel, commands, activities and installations" and all such were to be coordinated by the DCI and CIA "to ensure centralized direction" of all clandestine activities. This was what President Eisenhower wanted, and what the NSCID provided.

Further DCID's were needed to spell out the field application of this directive, and here the road was not smooth. It was over a year and a half before a revised DCID 5/1 was finally issued on 8 December 1959. Drafts of a new DCID 5/1 were made which provided that, "All clandestine intelligence

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

activities abroad...shall be coordinated prior to their initiation by the appropriate designated representatives of the Director of Central Intelligence." If such representatives found a proposal harmful or potentially harmful, the reasons were to be given. To accomplish this, the proposing agency was to provide detailed information regarding the proposal. The Army, in particular, could not stomach this field supervision of its activities. The issue came to a head at the USIB meeting of 10 November 1959. General Willems, the Army G-2, said he could not

approve for the Department of the Army the granting to a non-military agency the power of arbitrary veto over prospective exploitation of clandestine intelligence resources proposed by a military service without the opportunity for that service to prepare justification and substantiation for its case through intelligent and discreet exploration of prospects and resources. 98/

While this position sounded plausible, it was clear that if a service could engage in exploration of prospects and resources, operations would be under way without any coordination or review before CIA heard about them.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Since USIB would not unanimously approve of the DCID, the DCI said he would refer the matter to the Secretary of Defense under the procedure prescribed in NSCID 1 for a case when there was disagreement between military members of USIB. He did so. 99/ It is apparent that Willems found out that he would not be backed up by the Secretary of Defense, for he soon came forward with some minor modifications, essentially nonsubstantive, which he said would cure the objectionable features of the draft. These were accepted in a rump session of a few USIB members with Cabell; the DCI withdrew his memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, and the DCID was approved on 8 December 1959.

It is interesting to note that the Army's ambitions were for operations far beyond those specified in NSCID 5. In January 1959, Truscott recorded a conversation he had with General Cassidy, the Executive Secretary of the PBCFIA, in which the latter reported on a conversation with Willems.

He [General Willems] was also critical of the CIA failure to meet Army OB requirements in general and cited Lebanon and

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Cuba as recent examples. [Two locations in which, at the time, there were almost certainly no Soviet forces.] He used these as illustrations of what he considers to be the Army's justification for expansion in clandestine collection on a global basis. 100/

Meanwhile, the problem in the field had not become easier. The issuance of NSCID 5 in April 1958 had not had much effect. In his semiannual report of CIA activities to the PBCFIA covering the period 1 October 1958 to 31 March 1959, Dulles wrote:

As in the past, the preponderance of time and effort expended both in the field and at national level on coordination has been devoted to U.S. Army clandestine intelligence plans and activities. A marked interest in expansion by Army in this field has become increasingly evident. U.S. Air Force clandestine intelligence activities have in general decreased as a result of their review of such activities and the decision to emphasize the quality rather than quantity of operations. U.S. Navy clandestine intelligence activity remains negligible. 101/

Final agreement on the series of DCID's which spelled out procedures for coordination did not solve all the problems. In his semiannual report to the PBCFIA covering the period from 1 April to 30 September 1960, Dulles said,

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

In our last report we stressed the importance of the meaningful intelligence directives which had been issued and which we assumed would provide much closer and more complete coordination of clandestine intelligence activities. We were most hopeful that, with the full cooperation of the other U.S. intelligence services, we would be able to make the U.S. clandestine effort a well coordinated one. Much work has gone into the coordinating program, and we believe that the results have been fairly satisfactory. It should be pointed out, however, that U.S. Army cooperation has not been complete. Instructions issued by the Army to its field elements, where most of the coordination takes place, have tended to restrict the operational matters to be coordinated in the field, rather than to encourage full and complete coordination. Such action on the part of the Army has made the job of coordination more difficult and time-consuming, as it has created questions and problems which have had to be referred to Washington for solution. 102/

The same report goes on to say, a little wistfully,

Outlook: Coordination will proceed satisfactorily only if all branches of the Armed Forces accept in practice the need for prior, comprehensive and continuing coordination of clandestine intelligence activities.

(The last phrase is an almost exact quotation from NSCID 5.)

The discussion thus far has been on the problems

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

in Germany. There were also problems elsewhere -- for example, in Panama where the rather formidable US Army establishment conducted operations not only in Panama but into the whole Caribbean area. 103/ Although there were friendly and cooperative relations between Army Intelligence and CIA, coordination as prescribed by NSCID 5 was sketchy. One dodge used by the Army in Panama as elsewhere was to define "clandestine" as applying only to operations where the agent involved did not know of the US interest. All other operations, it was claimed, were "covert" and not covered by the NSCID. In spite of Army intransigence in Panama and elsewhere, the emphasis in this study has been on Germany for there the problem was the most acute and the operations of greatest extent.

As time passed, this problem of "agreed activities" became, in the opinion of CIA officers familiar with the German scene, generally less acute, although it has by no means disappeared today (1973). A variety of factors were at work. In Washington, the principle of the overriding coordinating responsi-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

bility of the DCI was so firmly established that it became clear that open challenges would be defeated. The generation of military intelligence officers that learned to distrust the acquisitive habits of CIA in the immediate postwar years largely gave way to those who had learned that the experience and professionalism of CIA operators could be of help to them. Technical means of intelligence collection increased and proved so valuable and were so much in vogue (especially those techniques which lent themselves to producing data which could be handled by that favorite modern magician, the computer) that human collection by agents lost some of its glamor. Further, the demands for technical collection and processing resulted in claims on the service intelligence budgets which were at the expense of funds available for clandestine collection. Service intelligence officers lost to some extent the belief that CIA was trying to put them out of business. The Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities (which was interdepartmental in membership) was able in its report of 15 December 1960 to say that

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

The Joint Study Group has not been able to find any authoritative CIA opinion subscribing to the belief that CIA should pre-empt clandestine operations as its own exclusive province. There was abundant evidence of CIA opinion to the contrary. 104/

Certain forces remained at work, however, to militate against a fully coordinated clandestine effort. Many military commanders, sometimes influenced by parochial and ambitious intelligence officers, continued to have a preference for intelligence produced by people under their own command, or part of their own service. Reliance on an outside civilian agency was, to varying degrees, distasteful. Military organizational doctrine assigned to a field commander the responsibility for assuring the security of his forces and the installations they occupied. This was the basis for counterintelligence operations. The commander determined his own requirements and methods. Since it was difficult to make a clear distinction between clandestine operations needed for counterintelligence purposes and those targeted for positive intelligence, a commander was predisposed to support most

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

projects of his subordinates. Commanders were usually not professionally experienced in intelligence, particularly clandestine collection, and were rotated at relatively short intervals. They were thus often hesitant to judge the merits of proposals for operations; superior commands, particularly Washington, were not inclined to interfere in a field commander's area of responsibility. The result was a system not conducive to carrying out the neat symmetrical system of coordination and avoidance of duplication worked out by staff officers at the national level. The services had their own bureaucracies, just as did the civilian departments and agencies. These bureaucracies had the same ability to frustrate the application of tidy organizational schemes which they believed ran counter to the way they wanted things to work. No government could overcome this; it could only be overcome when the desirability of change became apparent to the bureaucrats.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

## Chapter 3

Evolution of USIB

Nowhere in the development of US intelligence organizations and activities under the National Security Act of 1947 does the changing and growing role of the DCI appear more clearly than in the metamorphosis of the various advisory and operating bodies set up by the National Security Council (NSC) -- the Intelligence Advisory Committee (IAC), the US Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB), and the US Intelligence Board (USIB). The Act established the NSC as the highest supervisory body of the intelligence community. The NSC, in turn, set up subsidiary bodies and prescribed procedures for the coordinated functioning of the intelligence community.

NSCID 1, which has always been the basic charter of the DCI and CIA and which defines their relation-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ship to the rest of the community, provided from its earliest versions for an Intelligence Advisory Committee which was specifically stated to be advisory to the DCI. Indeed, even before enactment of the National Security Act, President Truman's directive of 22 January 1946 established the National Intelligence Authority, the Central Intelligence Group, and an official to be known as the DCI, and an Intelligence Advisory Board (IAB) to advise the DCI. Although in the earliest days there was some controversy as to whether the IAC was endowed with collective responsibility or was merely advisory to the DCI, this issue had been eliminated as such by General Smith by the time the 1952 version of NSCID 1 was issued. 105/

General Cabell, who was a member of the IAC representing the Air Force during the administration of Admiral Hillenkoetter, General Smith's predecessor, said that the Admiral on many occasions insisted that the IAC had no function except to advise him. Cabell felt that the service and State Department members resented the Admiral's continual reiteration of this narrow view. The limited effectiveness of the IAC

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

at this period and the lack of cooperation between its other members and Hillenkoetter was, Cabell believed, largely due to this attitude.

When Smith took office, he had a different method of operation. There was no question but that he understood that the IAC was advisory to him and that the IAC members understood this too. But Smith went out of his way to consult the IAC and, Cabell said, to treat them almost as if they were advisory to the NSC. A considerable growth in the effectiveness of the IAC resulted, and the dissatisfaction of the IAC members receded.

In the ordinary course of proceedings, the question of the IAC's power or rather lack of power was not often raised after Dulles became DCI. As has been stressed before, it was not his style of operation to force matters of disagreement and then to appeal to higher authority to resolve them, although he would do so when he believed they were substantive and urgent. Rather, he sought by conciliation and negotiation to reach agreements which could be accepted by all concerned, even carrying

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

the process of negotiation on for months, if not years.

This preference for reaching consensus was manifested primarily in matters which involved operating relationships between members of the community. One of the important fields of IAC activity in which it did not apply was the approval of NIE's. He realized that while disagreements and dissents on important estimative judgments tended to decrease the value of estimates in that a unanimous judgment carried more weight than one which was not, he also believed that dissents were sometimes useful, particularly when evidence was scanty; in such a case a dissent sharpened an issue and thereby better alerted the user. In a few cases, when he believed that the evidence was lacking for a firm judgment, he had the dissenting views of USIB members printed as part of the main text of the estimate, rather than as footnotes of dissent. One outstanding example was NIE 11-8-60, insofar as it dealt with the Soviet ICBM program.\* In that estimate,

---

\* This estimate, and the circumstances surrounding it, are discussed at length in Volume V, Chapter 2, under the title "The Missile Gap."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

three separate and quite different sets of estimates were part of the text, one representing the Air Force view, one the Army and Navy view, and one Dulles's view. And indeed it was Dulles's view, since his CIA support, including the Board of National Estimates, had favored a smaller Soviet program. But this was a case in which the evidence was fragmentary, the size of the Soviet ICBM program was a matter of public controversy in the midst of a Presidential election campaign, and Dulles probably believed that a clear statement of all the divergent estimates was wise and called for.

Dulles did not hesitate, however, to make up his mind and invite dissents when it was clear that agreement could not be reached on important matters and he believed the evidence was convincing. Particularly in the case of some of the Soviet military estimates, he knew in advance that agreement was highly unlikely. There were "standard" dissents which could be expected. For example, for years the Navy dissented from the estimates of Soviet production of fissionable materials. In the late

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1950's, the Army dissented from the estimates of .. future Soviet heavy bomber production believing that future production would be smaller. The Air Force was alone in maintaining that the Soviets were making significant efforts towards the development of nuclear powered aircraft. These divergent views appear as dissents in the relevant estimates.

It might be noted at this point that in 1956 there was a proposal that a representative of the US Information Agency (USIA) should become a member of the IAC. Theodore Streibert, the Director of USIA, appeared at the IAC meeting of 8 May 1956 and presented the case for USIA membership. This proposal was considered by the IAC members, who turned it down at the IAC meeting of 19 June, presumably on the ground that USIA did not have professional intelligence officers who were competent in analysis and evaluation. The State Department was probably strongly opposed.

The IAC was useful as a forum in which matters of concern to the community could be discussed, and Dulles, following in this case the practice of Smith,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

made full use of it for this purpose. He obviously .. felt that the protracted discussions in the IAC served the purpose of preserving harmony in the community. When it came time in 1957, under the prodding of the President's Board, to undertake a major revision and consolidation of all the NSCID's, Dulles had in Truscott a patient negotiator who was able to smooth out differences and to achieve agreement without bitterness or lasting dissatisfaction.

#### USCIB

The course of events relating to the role of the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) and the DCI's relation to it was quite different and more dramatic. The USCIB was established on 13 June 1946. One month later the CIG became a member. On 15 October, DCI Vandenberg was elected chairman. This role of chairman was almost the opposite of the DCI's position as chairman of the IAC. A formal delineation of the functions of USCIB was contained in NSCID 9 (29 December 1952). This directive provided that the "USCIB shall be reconstituted as a body acting for and under the Special Committee." (The Special Com-

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

mittee was the Special Committee of the NSC for Communications Intelligence (COMINT) "which shall, with the assistance of the DCI, establish policies governing COMINT activities....") Members of USCIB included the DCI as chairman, representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense and of the Directors of the FBI and NSA, representatives of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and a representative of the CIA. (The distinction between the designations of the representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense and those of the service departments probably arose out of the fact that the Secretaries of State and Defense constituted the NSC Special Committee.)

NSCID 9 went on to provide that

It shall be the duty of the Board to advise and make recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, in accordance with the following procedure, with respect to any matters relating to communications intelligence which falls within the jurisdiction of the Director of NSA.

The procedure related to the reaching of decisions. Action was to be taken by majority vote but the representatives of the Secretaries of State and Defense, of the Director of the FBI and of the CIA

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

should have two votes each; other members had one .. vote. The DCI, as chairman, had no vote. In case the representative of the Secretary of Defense was outvoted, and in other cases, there were special provisions for appeal to the Secretary of Defense, a logical arrangement since the board was only advisory to the Secretary of Defense anyway.

It was also the duty of the Board "as to matters not falling within the jurisdiction of NSA"

(1) To coordinate the communications intelligence activities among all departments and agencies authorized by the President to participate therein;

(2) To initiate, to formulate policies concerning, and subject to the provisions of NSCID No. 5, to supervise all arrangements with foreign governments in the field of communications intelligence.

Paragraph 2 of the directive was addressed to the Secretary of Defense and largely covered matters relating to NSA. One provision (Paragraph 2.d.) stated that the collection activities of all agencies were to be under the operational and technical control of the Director of NSA.

Thus in the early days, the DCI was the non-voting chairman of a body which advised the Secretary of

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Defense regarding an activity over which the latter had a considerable degree of control, for NSA was funded by Defense, its Director was an officer of the Armed Forces, and many of its activities were carried out by military personnel. It is to be noted also that with respect to "matters not falling within the jurisdiction of NSA," the board as such was given the duty of coordinating activities, formulating policies, etc. In other words, the board as a body was, at least nominally, given powers and duties. The weighted voting gave the various representatives of Defense and the services an aggregate of one-half the votes, that is, a veto -- a fact which probably explains the somewhat Byzantine voting procedure.

#### Merger of IAC and USCIB

Thus when the matter of the merger of the IAC and the USCIB came up, there was at once raised the kind of jurisdictional issue which delights bureaucrats and brings out the combative qualities of all concerned. The PBCFIA recommended the merger to the President in 1957. 106/ On Presidential instruction,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

this recommendation was referred to the DCI. The revision and consolidation of all outstanding NSCID's, under the overall management of Truscott, was in full swing, but discussions of the merger were undertaken. There was opposition from the start, and strongly held opposition. Although the members of the community were no longer troubled by the question as to whether the IAC was only advisory to the DCI, the services and other Pentagon representatives were definitely opposed to losing such positions of power as they had in USCIB. As has been pointed out, the DCI as chairman of USCIB had no vote, and USCIB was empowered to decide issues by vote. Furthermore, it seemed to have things to vote about.

As a practical matter, voting was very seldom resorted to. General Cabell as DDCI normally chaired USCIB, and it was his practice to try always to reach a consensus and to postpone or adjust non-urgent issues until a consensus was reached. 107/ This fact did little to smooth jurisdictional hackles when the proposal to change departmental powers was made. It was one thing for Truscott to argue, as

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

he did in a memorandum to the DCI, 108/ that "centralized direction of the intelligence effort in terms of 'command' can be exercised only *by or in the name of the NSC, in effect, the President,*" and thus by implication that the apparent powers given to the USCIB were, in the last analysis, a matter of convenience for the President and the NSC. It was quite another for the service chiefs to accept what they considered a further downgrading of their status by changing their apparent power to decide things in the electronic intelligence field into a privilege to advise a DCI who had not even had a vote in the USCIB.\* The services had already lost some status when the Joint Intelligence Committee of the JCS had been dissolved and the intelligence functions of the Joint Staff increased. The other Defense members of USCIB were opposed to giving the DCI any real power in the field which had been their own since its beginning. Their arguments were couched in terms of the necessity of protecting the security of

---

\* It was, of course, true that CIA as an entity had voting power, but only as one voter among several.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COMINT, the technical nature of the matters discussed in USCIB, the difficulty of having the same representatives deal with the substantive matters of national intelligence, e.g. discussing NIE's, and the technical problems of electronics. It became clear that no agreement on the merger and its terms was going to be reached quickly.

Early in 1958, the DCI addressed a memorandum to the Executive Secretary of the NSC outlining his consultations with the IAC and USCIB agencies. 109/ The opposition to the merger by the three services and the Joint Staff was noted. State and AEC were in favor of the merger, and the FBI was neutral. Defense passed and NSA didn't care one way or the other so long as it received adequate policy guidance from someone with authority. The DCI rehearsed the arguments for and against the separate treatment of COMINT. He said that those favoring the merger thought further study would be necessary to determine responsibilities and procedures and to develop adequate safeguards for COMINT. As to the DCI's own position, he said,

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

It is my own conclusion that, while there is much to recommend a merger and it may eventually be desirable, it should not be directed at this time.

He gave as his reasons the "opposition on the part of many of the most important members of USCIB," the existing good working relations between IAC and USCIB, and doubts that any saving of time or effort would be accomplished by the merger. What was probably the real issue was also mentioned by the DCI when he wrote

the merger would call for a prior major decision in principle with regard to the position of the Director of Central Intelligence. As Chairman of the IAC, the IAC members are advisers to him, whereas in the case of USCIB he is the non-voting Chairman. A decision as to a change in the DCI's status, if it is desirable, should in my opinion be reached independently and prior to undertaking a merger.

This recommendation for delay received short shrift. The PBCFIA, in a letter to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, commented on the DCI's letter. It said that the DCI had misunderstood the proposal. The idea had been to have a single board to advise him in the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

discharge of his responsibility for coordination of all operations concerned with both special and other forms of intelligence which, together, constitute the foreign intelligence effort of the U.S. Such a group would be concerned principally with policy and guidance matters.

Operational and other non-policy functions now being performed by the IAC and the USCIB separately should be dealt with by appropriate committees at the Departmental level. [Whatever that may mean]. These could continue to be handled on a compartmented basis to the extent that that might be desirable for security reasons.

Parenthetically, it is interesting to note yet another appearance of the myth of the separate nature of policy and operations as if policy could be made in a vacuum, and not be based on operational feasibility.

This letter of the PBCFIA brought quick results. The record of the meeting of the NSC on 13 March 1958 contains the following:

NSC Action 1873, Paragraph f. Noted that the President has approved [note the past tense] a recommendation of the PBCFIA that there be established a single group to assist and advise the Director of Central Intelligence in discharging his responsibility for the coordination of all operations concerned with both special and other

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

forms of intelligence which, together, constitute the foreign intelligence effort of the United States; such single group to be assigned the policy, coordinating, and supervisory responsibility presently assigned to the United States Communications Intelligence Board and the IAC the remaining functions of USCIB and IAC to be redistributed to appropriate subcommittees.

It went on to say that the President had approved a directive to the DCI to prepare a draft NSCID within six months. A pencilled note in the margin of the copy of this Action in the Agency files, probably in Dulles's handwriting, says

not discussed at NSC meeting. Cutler says decision had been made day before [12 March]. Letter to DCI with import was dated 14 March. This goes beyond recs [recommendations] of Bd.

This presumably refers to the fact that although the PBCFIA had recommended that "policy and guidance" was to be assigned to the merged board with "operational and other non-policy functions" handled by committees, the Presidential directive gave the merged board the "policy, coordinating, and supervisory responsibilities presently assigned to USCIB and IAC."

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

In any event, the decision by the competent authority was clear. There would be a prompt merger. This was made doubly clear at a joint meeting of the IAC and USCIB on 22 April 1958, which was attended by Robert Cutler, the Presidential Assistant; General Hull, the Chairman of the PBCFIA; James S. Lay, Jr., Executive Secretary of the NSC; and others. Hull restated the views of his board as described above.

General Cutler outlined the President's attitude regarding the proposed merger of IAC and USCIB. In particular he noted the President's personal interest in a further integration and coordination of the activities of the intelligence community and the importance he attached to the ready availability of an integrated end-product in a time of crisis. General Cutler also commented on the President's view with respect to expediting the merger of the present boards. 110/

The meeting went on to discuss the subject, but in terms of how to deal with the practical problems. The decision to merge had been made. The arguments were not, however, over. At the 22 April 1958 IAC/USCIB meeting discussed above, Truscott was asked to prepare a draft of revised NSCID's (principally NSCID 1) to carry out the NSC Action quoted. He did so, and the arguments continued.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

One matter was that of membership in the merged board. The members of IAC and USCIB believed that all members of both should be included. 111/ This was not what the PBCFIA apparently thought; they

envisaged a smaller Board at the top departmental level with its membership composed of individuals directly responsible to the heads of those departments represented on the NSC who are concerned with foreign intelligence activities. 112/

The Bureau of the Budget also was inclined to favor a smaller board, e.g. one on which the JCS represented the military departments. 113/ Cabell explained Dulles's point of view that

it was essential that those agencies with collection, evaluation and production capabilities be included ... and that the present organization of the DOD did not permit adequate control and coordination by the JCS or the Defense representative.

It should be noted that the services at that time did indeed control their own collection, evaluation, and production assets; the transfer of many of those assets to DIA was two years off. Aside from this practical consideration, the opposition of the various Defense components to any merger made it clear that a merger which resulted in their being

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ousted from membership in the senior advisory and coordinating body would have almost insured an atmosphere in which cooperation and joint efforts would be very difficult. As will be mentioned later, even after DIA was formed and the services lost most of their intelligence production assets, the service representatives remained members of USIB for almost three years, and even after they became observers, they attended USIB meetings, were privileged to speak and dissent, and exercised that privilege.

The PBCFIA or the Bureau of the Budget might look at an organization chart and believing, quite rightly that a small body acts more efficiently than a large one, pick from the chart a level of representation which would embrace the interests of several organizational units. Thus it might look on paper as if the services could be represented by JCS or Defense or, with greater justification at a later date, by DIA. But the realities and subtleties of government bureaucracy do not work that way. They defy simplified solutions; a system which depends on cooperation and coordination, if it is

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

to work, needs the willing acceptance of those who have to cooperate. This was firmly believed by Dulles, and neither the PBCFIA nor the Bureau of the Budget pressed the point of different levels of representation.

On 29 May 1958, the IAC secretariat circulated Truscott's draft of a revised NSCID 1. It was proposed that this be put on the agenda of a joint IAC-USCIB meeting "at an early date," and Truscott said his assistants could be available for discussions of the draft before the formal meeting. 114/ There were preliminary meetings with representatives of the Department of Defense and the services and a more formal meeting with the service chiefs on 2 July 1958. 115/ Apparently the Pentagon proposed changes in Truscott's draft which, in essence, would give substantive powers to USIB. They tabled for the 2 July 1958 meeting suggested revisions which, in Truscott's view, "would create a duality of responsibility to the NSC in the field of foreign intelligence..." which Truscott believed to be at variance with the National Security Act. 116/

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Among the arguments for a role greater than advising the DCI were allegations that since national policy in the intelligence field had a direct bearing on the allocation of funds and personnel, and since the Department of Defense made the largest contribution to intelligence in terms of men, money, and resources, Defense should have a stronger voice in the development of intelligence policy. Truscott found these arguments weak. His memorandum to the DCI spelled out his views, which were really unassailable. The DCI had no power of "command decision." Only the NSC, or in fact, the President had that. The DCI could recommend to the NSC, but the concurrence or dissent of USIB members was required. The same was true with respect to the issuance of DCID's, the supplementary directions spelling out in detail the application of NSCID's. The arguments made by the Pentagon were probably based on considerations of prestige and face rather than substance. In any event, they did not prevail. The revised NSCID 1, virtually in the form drafted by Truscott, was issued by the NSC on 15 September 1958, and the

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

first meeting of the USIB took place the next day. ..

In 1961, a drastic reorganization of the intelligence components in the Department of Defense took place, partly as a result of the recommendations of the Joint Study Group in 1960. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) was established, and most of the production assets of the service intelligence components were to be transferred to DIA. This, in theory, would have immediately changed the composition of USIB. The change was, however, very gradual. On 10 October 1961 the representative of DIA attended a USIB meeting for the first time. 117/ The USIB meeting of 25 October was the last meeting attended by the representative of the Office of Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense. 118/ It was not until 1 July 1963 that the representative of the Joint Staff left USIB and not until 4 March 1964, more than 2 1/2 years after DIA was formed, that the service chiefs of intelligence ceased to be formal members of USIB and became observers. 119/

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~Appendix ASource References

1. Philip K. Edwards, "The President's Board: 1956-60," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. XIII, No. 3, pp. 113ff.
2. Memo, Dulles to Senate Armed Services Committee, 25 Apr 47. HS/HC 400, item 9.
3. Memo, President Eisenhower to NSC, Aug 57, E.R. 9-6050. CIA Records Center, Job 64-345, "NSC-1954 through 1957."
4. Attachment to memo from Dulles to Gen. Robert Cutler, 8 Jul 57, E.R. 9-5120.
5. Memo, Kirkpatrick to Dulles, 25 Sep 57, E.R. 9-72815. CIA Archives, Job 66-503, file "IG-1957 No. 6."
6. IAC-M-285, 12 Apr 57. USIB files.
7. USIB-D-39 6/1, 10 Feb 60. USIB files.
8. USIB-M-75, 12 Jan 60. USIB files.
9. USIB-D-39 6/2, 12 Jul 60. USIB files.
10. USIB-D-39 6/3, 12 Jul 60. USIB files.
11. Memo, Exec. Sec. NSC to Sec. Defense, 5 Aug 60. NIPE files, PBCFIA "Recommendation 4."
12. PBCFIA report to President, 4 Oct 60. NIPE files, PBCFIA "Recommendation 4."
13. USIB-D-39 6/4, 17 Nov 60. TS 172786. USIB files.
14. USIB-D-39 6/6, 9 Jan 61. USIB files.
15. USIB-D-39 6/9, 18 Apr 61. USIB files.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

16. USIB-D-39 6/9 rev. (final), 2 May 61. USIB files.
17. NSCID 8, 18 Jan 61.
18. Samuel J. Fanning, *Offices of the Directorate for Intelligence, 1953-60*, CIA Historical Series, HS-4, Vol. II, p. 88.
19. Letter, Val Peterson to Dulles, 19 Jan 54. CIA Archives No. 4658 (TS/RD/SI), NIE 11-6-54 development file.
20. IAC-D-81, 10 Mar 54. USIB files.
21. IAC-M-145, 16 Mar 54. USIB files.
22. Memo, Quarles to Dulles, 26 Mar 54. CIA Archives No. 4658 (TS/RD/SI), NIE 11-6-54 development file.
23. IAC-M-146, 30 Mar 54. USIB files.
24. Draft of minutes, IAC Sec. to Cabell, 30 Mar 54. CIA Archives No. 4658 (TS/RD/SI), NIE 11-6-54 development file.
25. Wayne G. Jackson interview with Gen. Cabell, December 1969.
26. Memo, Chadwell to Dulles, 3 Mar 54. CIA Archives No. 4658 (TS/RD/SI), NIE 11-6-54 development file.
27. Memo, Chadwell to Dulles, 29 Mar 54. CIA Archives No. 4658 (TS/RD/SI), NIE 11-6-54 development file.
28. Wayne G. Jackson interview with Sherman Kent, December 1969.
29. TS 101647. CIA Archives No. 4658 (TS/RD/SI), NIE 11-6-54 development file.
30. IAC-D-81/7, 8 Feb 55. USIB files.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

31. IAC-D-81/9, 31 May 55. USIB files.
32. IAC-M-200, 14 Jun 55. USIB files.
33. *Ibid.*
34. IAC-D-81/10, 5 Jul 55. USIB files.
35. IAC-D-81/11, 8 Jul 55. USIB files.
36. IAC-M-204, 12 Jul 55. USIB files.
37. IAC-D-81/13, 4 Nov 55. USIB files.
38. IAC-M-222, 13 Dec 55. USIB files.
39. IAC-D-81/14 (Tab B), 13 Jan 56. USIB files.
40. *Ibid.*
41. DCID 3/4 (Annex D), 31 Jan 56.
42. *Ibid.* (Annex C).
43. Memo, Chadwell to Dulles, 13 Jun 55. CIA Records Center, Job 60-501, Box 4.
44. "Draft history of OSI," p. 47. Files of OSI Historical Officer.
45. IAC-D-10, 28 Dec 50;  
IAC-D-10/1, 11 Jan 51;  
IAC-D-10/4, 6 Jul 51;  
IAC-D-10/5, 23 Jul 51;  
IAC-D-10/6, 29 Feb 52;  
IAC-D-10/7, 31 Dec 52;  
IAC-D-10/9, 10 Feb 54.
46. "Draft history of OSI" (44, above).
47. Memo, Kent to Eckel, 24 Jan 55, TS 101935.
48. "Draft history of OSI" (44, above).
49. *Ibid.*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

50. IAC-D-10/18 (final), 20 Dec 55; issued as Annex C to DCID 3/4, 24 Jan 56.
51. Fanning, *op. cit.* (18, above).
52. Memo for the record, C. L. Cooper, 25 Nov 58. NIE 11-2-59 development file, folder No. 1.
53. Memo, Cooper to Graham, 25 Nov 58. NIE 11-2-59 development file, folder No. 1.
54. Wayne G. Jackson, "Scientific Estimating," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. IX, No. 3, p. 7.
55. "Draft history of OSI" (44, above).
56. NSCID 17, 16 May 55.
57. Charles A. Kroger, Jr., "ELINT, A Scientific Intelligence System," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. II, No. 1, p. 71.
58. Memo, "CIA Electronic Intercept Program," approved by DCI 29 May 54, TS 93193 (Tab E attached to Memo, Chief Management Staff to Acting DDA, 17 Aug 54, TS 58009; See also: Elizabeth Fisher, *History of the Office of Elint to December 1966*, Part I, 1968 (DD/S&T Historical Series, HS Project 4.005).
59. Memo, Chief Management Staff to Acting DDA, 17 Aug 54, TS 58009.
60. *Ibid.* (Tab D, TS 78322).
61. Fanning, *op. cit.*, (18, above) p. 44.
62. Memo, DCI to Sec. Air Force, 11 May 55. CIA Records Center, Job No. 58-295, AD/SI files.
63. "Draft history of OSI" (44, above), p. 29.
64. Wayne G. Jackson interview with George Miller (CIA ELINT Officer 1958-61), 20 Nov 69.

~~SECRET~~


~~SECRET~~

65. USIB 9.7/21, 13 Feb 58. USIB files.
66. USIB 9.4/59, 9 Jun 58. USIB files.
67. Fisher, *op. cit.* (58, above), p. 13; Wayne G. Jackson interview with George Miller, 20 Nov 69.
68. Wayne G. Jackson interview with Gen. Cabell, Sep 1970.
69. DOD S-3115.2 and DOD S-5100.20, 19 Mar 59.
70. P. K. Edwards "The President's Board; 1956-60," *Studies in Intelligence*, Vol. XIII, No. 3, p. 113.
71. Letter, Dulles to Eisenhower, 15 Nov 55. E.R. 7-6176.
72. PBCFIA, Report to the President, 20 Dec 56. NIPE files.
73. Draft letter, Dulles to Eisenhower, 8 Jul 57. E.R. 9-6050.
74. Memo, President to NSC, 5 Aug 57. E.R. 9-6050.
75. Memo, Truscott to Dulles, 11 Mar 58. E.R. 60-1528.
76. Memo, Dulles to Ex. Sec., NSC, 24 Dec 60. NIPE files, "PBCFIA Recommendation 33, 4 Oct 60."
77. NSCID 5, 12 Dec 47, TS 64152.
78. W. Lloyd George, *FI Staff Coordination under NSCID 5, 1951-67*, CS/HP 108 (TS): M. R. Ehrmantraut, *NSCID 5, 1946-51*, CS/HP 224.
79. CS/HP 108 (78, above), Appendix A.
80. NSCID 5, 28 Aug 51, TS 030574.
81. CS/HP 108 (78, above), Appendix E.
82. *Ibid.*

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

83. Wayne G. Jackson interviews with Gen. Cabell and Lloyd George, Sep 1970.
84. DCID 5/1, 11 Jan 55, par. 2.
85. IAC-M-180. USIB files.
86. 
87. Letter, Dulles to Anderson, 22 Jul 55, TS 142668, in same envelope as 86, above.
88. Wayne G. Jackson interview with Lawrence R. Houston, Jan 1970.
89. Letter in E.R. folder labeled "Major General Arthur G. Trudeau -- Eyes Only -- for ODCI or IG."
90. Memo, Lawrence R. Houston, in same folder as 89, above.
91. *Ibid.*
92. Wayne G. Jackson interview with Lawrence R. Houston, Jan 1970.
93. Dulles, memo of conversation with J. Patrick Coyne of PBCFIA, 24 Jul 56. NIPE files, "PBCFIA Briefings and Coverage, DCI -- Feb 56-Jan 61."
94. Kirkpatrick, memo of conversation with General Cassidy, 29 Apr 58. NIPE files, same folder as 93, above.
95. PBCFIA report to the President, 20 Dec 56, Recommendation 9. NIPE files.
96. Wayne G. Jackson interview with Gordon Stewart and Don Huefner, Chief, DDP/FI Coordination Staff.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

97. NSCID 5, 21 Apr 58, TS 030574.
98. USIB-M-65, 10 Nov 59. USIB files.
99. Memo attached to USIB-D-61.3/5, 16 Nov 59.
100. Truscott, memo for the record, 30 Jan 59, E.R. 11-714/1.
101. Dulles, report to PBCFIA, 1 Oct 58 - 31 Mar 59, p. 47. NIPE files.
102. Dulles, report to PBCFIA, 1 Apr - 30 Sep 60, p. 49. NIPE files.
103. Wayne G. Jackson interview with Foster Collins, [REDACTED]
104. Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities, report, 12 Dec 60, pp. 28-9. NIPE files.
105. L. L. Montague, *The Intelligence Advisory Committee*, 1954, HS/HC 195.
106. PBCFIA report to the President, 24 Oct 57, Recommendation 2. NIPE files.
107. Wayne G. Jackson interview with Ralph Clark, early Agency ELINT staff officer, Nov 1969.
108. Memo, Truscott to Dulles, 1 Jul 58. E.R. 10-5169. E.R. file "Truscott, DD/C," in CIA Records Center, Job No. 66-503.
109. Memo, Dulles to Lay, 29 Jan 58. E.R. 10-605.
110. IAC-M-338, 22 Apr 58. USIB files.
111. Memo, Truscott to Dulles (108, above), par. 1b.
112. *Ibid.*, par 1a.
113. Truscott, memo for the record, sub: Consultation relative to item 4, NSC Action 1978, 4 Sep 58. E.R. 10-6932.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 114. IAC-D-120. USIB files.
- 115. Memo, Truscott to Dulles (108, above).
- 116. *Ibid.*
- 117. USIB-M-177. USIB files.
- 118. USIB-M-180. USIB files.
- 119. USIB-M-315. USIB files.

~~SECRET~~